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ABSTRACT 
Climate ch困lngeis as much a sociopolitical phenomenon as it is a geophysi-
cal one. Beyond contentious domestic politics and the intricacies of global cli-
mate governance， eviriced by the United Nations Framework Conνention on 
Climate Change (“UNFCCCつandover 25 years of subsequent negotiation， un-
abated climate change promises to upend centuries-old ザortsωbringorder 
and stabilityωcommunities across the globe. No one effect of climate change 
demonstrates that more than the loss of habitability driving climate-induced dis-
placement， migration， and relocation. Though discussed at the per伊heryof legal 
and policy discourse (mostly in academia)， decision-makers will soon have to 
confront loss of physical territory and the unviabiliηof many places human 
communities currently call home. Further， and consistent with so many of cli-
mate change' s worst impacts， the least responsible for climate upheaval will be 
subject to the most disruption-whether it is as a migrant or a host of those who 
have moved. In the United States， indigenous communities are at the介'ontlines
of planned relocation with no comprehensive framework for response or a deter-
mination of individual and community rights in the process. To effect security 
and well-being-a mandate forルnctioninglegal systems-a sw約 responseis 
critical. F品ur川t幼he町r九;m附oste訓tJ仇hi仰Cωalψf介ra捌m削 'or，巾ksd，必e仰仰m印!
Fewappreci，ωate t幼heenormity ~ザft仇he task. Acc印or，ぱdin噌gtωo estimates based on 
current UNFCCC state parties' n叫tionallか'yd必kμterminedc印ontributionsand current 
policies， the globe will likely experience a 3.20 to 3.40 Celsius temperature in-
crease by 2100. This increase would quite literally produce a whole new world. 
In light of what we do not know about how climate change will disrupt existing 
socio-political systems and what we do not know about the nature and content of 
so-called “climate surprises，" thおArticleargues that we are behind a veritable 
veil of ignorance. In this original position (marked by the current state of na-
ture)， a relevant theory of justice is required. Drawing on John Rωvls' seminal 
work， this Article argues that to forge a just socie砂 inan endlessly changing 
climate-and protect and advance the rights of al and particularかthemost 
vulnerable-a deep and concerted inquiry into which structures can support 
social justice is essential at this time. 
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rnTRODUCTION 
Climate change is as much a sociopolitical phenomenon as it is a geo-
physical one. Beyond contentious domestic politics and the in位icaciesof 
global climate governance， evinced by the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC勺andover 25 years of subsequent 
negotiation， unabated climate change prornises to upend centuries-old efforts 
for the legal system to bring order and stability to communities across the 
globe. Last year (2017) alone saw devastating and serial At1antic hurricanes， 
an oppressive heat wave in Europe dubbed Lucifer， and unprecedented wi1d-
fires in California.2 For the first time， scientists are explicit1y blaming these 
extreme events on humans and stating that血ey紅e“impossiblewithout 
2 Chris Vaccaro， Extremely Active 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season Finaly Ends， NATL 
OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.， U.S. DEP'r OF COM. (Nov. 30， 2017)， htp炉:I/www.noaa
.gov/m巴吋dia-rele巴aおs詑巴ef，巴xt甘remel砂y-aωcは凶tive-2却01口7叫 la釘叩ntic匂-h加】lUm町ca阻n巴.哨aおso叩n-fina叫叫1砂y-e叩ndωs [肌ht句tゆps配:/均/勿P巴釘r 
ma.c∞crπrCZ5ふ圃2R8A];Europe Swelters Under a Heat Wave Called 'Lucifer'， N.Y.τIMES (Aug. 
6， 2017)， https://www.nytimes.coml20 17 /08/06/world/europe/europe-heat-wave.html; Holly 
Yan， The Wildfires in California Just Keep Shattering Records This Year， CNN (De氾.26，2017，
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climate change."3 Some refer to this as the “new normal，"4 though “nor-
mal" suggests a new yet steady state. But that state is， by definition， elusive. 
Not only is change occurring now， but the rate of change is also increasing，5 
promising perpetually-shifting baselines. There are inherent uncertainties 白血
garding specific climate change impacts， particularly for impacts that might 
occur after 2050 and 2100. Nonetheless， given what scientists know about 
the underlying physics， the complex earth systems affected， and the speed at 
which climate change is advancing， a comprehensive destabilizing of the 
status quo might be inevitable even with aggressive action to mitigate and 
adapt adequately， neither of which appear forthcoming. 
This climate destabi1ization would have significant implications for the 
law， generally， and the civil and political rights of al of us， particularly the 
most vulnerable. In the United States， the field of climate justice has been 
concemed with the most vulnerable， as it explores the intersection of race， 
poverty， and climate change. Climate justice takes as a basic premise that the 
disadvantaged in the United States and the global South stand to suffer the 
risks of warming more severely than others.6 Growing evidence reveals that 
climate change will hit two specific groups “disproportionately and un-
fairly:" the poor and those living in island states.7 The vulnerability of these 
groups is based on the kinds of climate changes they will be exposed to as 
well as their ability-or inabilityー toprotect agむnstshifting weather pat-
2:57 PM)， http://www.cnn.comJ2017 /12/26/us/2017-califomia-wildfire-records-tmd/index 
.h回 1[https://perma.cc/5QQT-4XK3]. 
. -3 Extreme Weather ExplicitかBlamedon Humans for the First Time， NATURE (Dec. 19， 
2017)， https://www.nature.comJarticles/d41586-017-08808-y[https://perma.ccI7SC4-MZ6S]. 
4 Extreme Weather Events are the New Normal， NATURE (Aug. 29， 2017)， https://www 
.nature.comJnews/ex位eme-weather-events-are-白e-new-normal-1.22516 [https://perma.cc/ 
RG57-X6JV] (“Extreme weather events such as H紅 V巴ycan be described as‘unprecedented' 
only so many times before companies and govemments紅巳 forcedto accept出atsuch events 
紅巳由enew normal."). 
5 See D.J. Wuebbles et al.， Executive Summaη， inU.S. GLOB. CHANGE RES. PROGRAM， 1 
CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL REpORT: FOUR叩 NATIONALCLIMATE ASSESSMENT 1， 14 (D.J. 
Wuebbles et a1. eds.， 2017)， available at https://science2017.g10ba1change.gov/downloads/ 
CSSR_Executiv巴_Summary.pdf[https://perma.cc/SX8M-EZ52] (“Forcing due to human ac-
tivities. . .has become increasingly positive (warming) since about 1870， and has grown at an 
accelerated rate since about 1970."); id. at 33 (“Positive feedbacks (self-reinforcing cycles) 
within由巳 climatesystem have the potential to ac巴lerat巴human-inducedclimate change and 
even shift the Earth?s climate syst巴m[.]").
6 Climate justice also recognizes the direct kinship between social inequality and environ-
mental degradation， which is not isolated to the globa1 South. See generally Bunyan Bryant & 
Elaine Hockman， A Briザ Comparisonof the Civil 均 htsMovement and the Environmental 
Justice Movement， inPOWER， JUSTICE， AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A CRITICAL ApPRAISAL OF THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 34 (David Naguib Pellow & Robert J. Brulle eds.， 
2005).百四 most obvious example is the relatively ubiquitous siting of industrial power plants 
in environmenta1 justice communities， negatively afecting the public health and welfare of 
血osewho live in proximity while greatly con町ibutingto global warming. See id. 
7 Climate Change and the Poor: Adapt or Die， ECONOMIST， S巴pt.1， 2008， http://www 
.economist.com/node/12208005 [htps:/peロna.cc/JJ4L-A9YT](巴stimatingthe population of 
these two specific groups to be one bilion in 100 countries). See generally IPCC， Climate 
Change 2007:・lmpacts，Adaption and Vulnerabiliη， in IPCC FOURTH ASSESSMENT REpORT 
7-22 (207). 
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tems and acute hydro-meteorological events. In other words， climate change 
is expected to have a dramatic impact on dryland agriculture， coastal sys-
tems， and fisheries， the very systems on which the globe's poorest depend.8 
Further， the poorest of血epoor and small islanders lack the resources to 
defend themselves with， for example， expensive flood controls or sophisti-
cated public health programs. 
No one effect of climate change evinces this unprecedented and uneven 
destabilization more than the loss of habitability that凶ggersclimate-in-
duced displacement， migration， and relocation (hereinafter “climate migra-
tion").9 Decision-makers wi1 soon have to confront the many scenarios of 
climate migration: acute displacements resulting from storms like Hurricane 
Maria; 10 the sustained migration spurred by drought and desertification; the 
relocation of entire communities and peoples that follows loss of physical 
territory and the unviability of places many have called home for centuries; 
and more.1 Each scenario within countries and across intemational borders 
8 IPCC， supra note 7， at11-12. 
9 For ease and concision， 1 use “climate migration" as an umbrella term to describe the 
many different scenarios in which climate change may凶田町出巴 movementof people. Schol-
ars have provided many definitions for出巴 variedtypes of population movement. In白is訂 ti-
c1e，“migration" refers to the movement of persons intemally within a state or across an 
intemational border. This term encompasses出巴 diversityof triggers， periods of time， and 
V紅 iedtypes of movem巴nt.“Displacement"refers to the movement of persons forced or 
obliged to flee their places of habitual residence as a r，巴sultof violence， conflict， violations of 
human rights， or natura1 or man-made disasters. See INTL ORG. FOR MIGRATION， KEy MIGRA-
TηIONτERMS， htt旬p:/1八、Wνww.iom.intlkey子-migra幻tiぬon任1ト-t，飽:er口m町ms#Mi屯gration肋ht申ps:1I午p巴rma.cc/925Y-Y9P 
G]. 
voluntary 0ぽrforced caus巴sand on small 0町rla訂rg伊巴-sωcales.Jane McAdam & Elizabeth Ferris， 
Planned Relocations in the Context of Climate Change: Unpacking the Legal and Conceptual 
Issues，4 CAMBRIDGE J. OF INTL & COMP. L. 137， 139 (2015). For血epu叩osesof this discus-
sion， the term“migration" includ巴sthose persons experiencing displacement and planned re・
location vis-ふvissmall islands.“Managed Re田 at，"or the“strategic relocation of people or 
assets or abandonment of land，" is a specific type of movem巴nt-andsignificant planning 
conundrum-that does not fa11 within由巴 scopeqf this paper' s definition and discussion of 
migration. See STANFORD WOODS INST. FOR THE ENy'T， RESEARCH BRlEF: MANAGED RETREAT 
IN A CHANGING CLIMATE 1 ( Miyuki Hino， Katharine Mach & Chris Field eds.， 2017)， availa-
ble at https://woods.stanford.edu!sites/default/files/fileslWoods_Managed_RetreacRB-W巴bfin
.pdf [https://perma.cc/F895-4DQP]. 
10 Lizette Alvarez， A Great Migrationfrom Puerto Rico Is Set ωTranゆrmOrlando， N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 17， 2017)， https://www.nytimes.comJ2017/11/17/us/puerto-ricans-or1加do.htrI山一
r=O. 
1 See WALTER KλLIN & NINA SCH阻 P回 R，U.N. HIGH COMMR FOR REFUGEES， DIV. OF 
!NT'L PROT.， PROTECT別 GPEOPLE CROSSII叩 BORDERSIN THE CONTEXT OF CLIMATE CHANGE: 
NORMATIVE GAPS AND POSSIBLE ApPROACHES， at13-16， U.N. Doc. PPLN2012/01 (Legal & 
Protection Pol'y Res. Ser.， 2012)， available at http://www.u吐lcr.org/4f33f1729.pdf[https://per 
ma.cc尺J6SS-3QX4](identi今ingfive scenarios in which climate change may trigg巴rpopula-
tion 
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imp1icates numerous areas of 1aw， from internationa1 refugee 1aw to 10ca1 
property rightS.12 
During these events， the 1east responsib1e will be exposed to the most 
disruption-both as migrants and hosts of those who have moved. Small 
is1and deve10ping states face a 1ack of freshwater and the 10ss of habitable 
te国tOf)人l3Atoll communities， 1ike the Carteret Is1ands， have sought higher 
ground in neighboring is1ands within Papua New Guinea.14 In the United 
States， indigenous communities are at the front1ines of p1anned relocation 15 
without a comprehensive framework for response or a determination of indi-
vidua1 and community rights in the process of movement， from the moment 
of dis1ocation to resett1ement. To effect security and well-being-a mandate 
for functioning 1ega1 systems-a swift response is critical. Further， most eth-
ica1 frameworks demand白at出eresponse is just and equitable. 
Few appreciate the enormity of the task. According to estimates based 
on current nationally determined contributions to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions per the UNFCCC's Paris Agreement，16 the globe will1ike1y expe-
rience a 3.20 to 3.40 Ce1sius temperature increase by 2100.17 This increase 
wou1d trigger geophysica1 changes that wou1d quite 1iterally produce a 
who1e new world-and without a significant decrease in carbon emissions a 
greater increase may happen even inore quickly.18 Scientists warn that出e
rate of carbon emissions has “no-ana1ogue."19 C1imate change and its ripp1e 
effects are occurring at an unprecedented speed， and the alternative futures 
to which we are consigning ourse1ves range from deep1y disruptive to cata-
strophic. Even if the globa1 community comrnitted to and modelers dep10yed 
12 See Maxine Burkett， The Nation Ex-Situ: On Climate Change， Deterritori叫izedNa-
tionhood， and the Post-Climate Era， 2 CLIMATE L. 345， 348 (2011) (introducing the “post-
climate era" in law and society). See also Jane McAdarn， Environmental Migration Govern-
ance， inGLOB札 MIGRATIONGOVERNANCE 153， 157 (Alexander Bets ed.， 2009) (“百四 tradi-
tional ways in which law and policy have been divided into ‘fields' of inquiry and operation， 
such as‘human rights'，‘trade' ，‘development' and so on， do not reflect the messy， complex 
interconnect巴dnessof the isue."). 
13 See KALIN & SCHREP四 R，supra note 1， at5; Burkett， supra note 12， at351-55. 
14 See Maxine Burkett， Lessons from Contemporary Resettlement in the South Pac伊c，68 
J. OF INT'L. AFFAIRS 75， 76 (2015) 
15MAX悶 EBURKE廿， ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK & DAVID FLORES， CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE 
REFORM， Reaching Higher Ground: A venues to Secure and Manage N巴wLand for Communi-
ties Displaced by Climate Change 8 (2017)， available at htp:/progresivereform.org/articles/ 
ReachingHigherGround_1703.pdf [htps:!/perma.c/3EXN-L98W]. 
16 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change， Adoption of the Paris Agreement， 
U.N. Doc， FCCC/CP/20151L.9/Rev.l (Dec. 12，2015). 
17 Hanna Fekete， etal.， Improvement in Warming Outlook as India and China Move 
Ahead， but Paris Agreement Gap Stil Looms Large， CLIMATE ACTION TRACKER (Nov. 2017)， 
htp:/climateactiontracker.org/asets/publications/briefin!Lpapers/CAT _2017-11-15 _Improve-
ment-in-warming-out1ook.pdf [https:!/perma.ccIPL5M-UY57]. Worst case predictions based 
on continued high greenhouse gas ernisions growth suggest a 50Celsius temperature increas巴
by 2081-2100. See D.J. Wuebbles et a1.， supra note 5; see also infra Section I.A. 
18 Hanna Fekete， etal.， supra note 17. 
19 Richard E. Zeebe， Andy Ridgwell & James C. Zachos， Anthropogenic Carbon Release 
Rate Unprecedented During the Past 66 Million Years， 9 NATURE GEOSCIENCE 325， 325 
(2016). 
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a s.pecific emissions trajectory， the ability to predict the consequences of 
climate change with comfortable precision is limited and significant1y more 
difficult after 2100.20 The future is unknown. 
From出isposition of ignorance， perhaps the one certainty is that our 
current law and policy infrastructure is not up to the task. As Stephen Hum岨
phreys has shrewdly stated， the problem with the law is出at“itdoesn't quite 
do what it says on the tin."21 Our legal systems developed in a relatively 
stable climate envelope and under the assumption that， while the natural en-
vironment was variable， its outer limits were fixed.2 Specifically， environ-
mental and natural resources law are based on assumptions of ecological 
stasis and seek to preserve and restore this presumed stasis.23 Neither of 
these goals， as Robin Kundis Craig notes， fit in a world marked by continual， 
unpredictable， and nonlinear transformations of complex ecosystems.24 
Other areas of law are also an il fit， as climate change affects legal regimes 
ranging from localland use policy to global energy investment in an unprec-
edented fashion. Further， the field of intemational law， and the principles 
出atundergird it， developed during a period of rapid wealth acquisition in出e
West when numerous groups did not enjoy the ful promises of liberty and 
justice. These groups have not had a voice in shaping intemationallaw prin-
ciples， both at its development and continuing today.25 Historic injustices of 
colonialism， structural racism， and obstinate poverty now commingle with a 
bleak and uneven climate forecast戸 Theenduring inability to meet the chal-
20 See K. Hayhoe et al.， Climate Models， Scenarios， and Projections， in U.S. GLOB. 
CHANGE REs. PROGRAM， supra note 5 at133， 134， available at htps:/scienc巴2017.g10ba1
change.gov/down1oads/CSSR_Ch4_Climate_Mode1s_Scenarios_Projections.pdf [htps:/per 
ma.cc/XVB8・PV3U].
21 Stephen Humphreys， Climate Justice: The Claim of the Past， 5 J.OF HUM. R. & ENV'r 
134， 142 (2014). 
22 See， e.g.， Robin Kundis Craig， "Stationariηis Dead"ーLongLive Transformation: Five 
Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law， 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 10， 27 (2010) 
(quoting Tho NORDHAUS & MICHAEL SHELLENBERGER， BREAK THROUGH: FROM THE DEATH 
OF ENVIRONMENTALISM TO THE POLmcs OF POSSIBILITY 8 (2007)) (“To describe帥 secha1-
1enges as prob1ems of polution is to stretch白巴 meaningof the word beyond recognition. 
G1oba1 warrning is as diferent from smog in Los Ange1es as nuclear war is from gang vio-
1ence. The eco1ogica1 crises we face are more globa1， comp1ex， and tied to the basic function-
ing of the economy血anwere the prob1ems environmentalism was cr巴atedto adres forty 
ye訂sago. Global warrning血reat巴nshuman civilization so fundamentally血atit cannot be 
understood as a straightforward polution prob1em but instead as an existential one. Its impacts 
wil be so enormous白atit is beter understood as a prob1em of evo1ution， not polution.") 
23 See， e.g.， Craig， supra note 22， at27; J. B. Ruh1， Climate Change Adaptation and the 
Structural Transformation of Environmental Law， 40 EN円L.L. 363， 365-66 (2010). 
24 Craig， supra note 22， at27. 
25 In the context of intemationa1 environm巴nta11aw，se， e.g.， Sumudu Atapatu & Cむー
men G. Gonzalez， The North-South Divide in lnternational Environmental Law: Framing the 
lssues， inINTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANO THE GLOBAL SOUTH (Shawkat A1am et 
al. eds.， 2015). 
26 See， e.g.， Humphreys， supra note 21， at142; Anna Grear， Towards 'ClimateJustice'? A 
Critical Reflection an Legal SubjectiviηAnd Climate lnjustice: Warning Signals， Patterned 
Hierarchies， Directions for Future Law and Policy， 5 J.OF HUM. RTS. & ENV'r. 103， 103-33 
(2014). 
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lenges of inequity that climate change exacerbates;27 the climate surprises 
that are anticipated but currently unknowable; and the anernic (if not aggres-
sively inadequate) responses to the climate crisis at血istime altogether re-
quire serious engagement in crafting an adequate theory of justice. 
In light of what we do not know about how climate change will disrupt 
existing socio-political systems and what we do not know about the nature 
and content of climate surprises，28 the global community finds itself in the 
closest facsirnile to血estoried thought experiment: we are in reality behind a 
“veil of ignorance." As explicated in A Theory 01 Justice， which John Rawls 
published over 40 years ago and which builds on centuries old philosophical 
deliberation， a fictional veil is employed to better ensure that p紅 tieswho are 
crafting a new theory of justice do so without information that would bias 
the outcome. Behind the veil， one lacks knowledge of one's own particular 
place in society， specific assets， abilities or strengths. The veil， elaborated in 
the 1970s， remains evocative and strikingly relevant today. Given the current 
state of nature and the uncertainty inherent in pr吋ectedchanges，29 a relevant 
and durable theory of justice could ideally arise from good faith efforts to 
reform our law and policy infrastructure. 
Evoking Rawls' serninal work， this article seeks to galvanize scholars 
and decision-makers to begin forging that critical and transformative theory. 
The article intentionally adopts Rawls' general construction of the veil of 
ignorance and a sirnilar notion of the original position-particularly its itera-
tive nature.30 It seeks， however， to persuade those willing to engage in the 
justice-seeking exercise to utilize parameters and assumptions that are dis-
ーtinctfrom those set by Rawls， who relies heavily on rationalism.31 This紅 ti-
cle embraces exiled rights discourses-from critical出eoryto indigenous 
legal orders to Earth Jurisprudence32-that rnight meet the challenge of 
27 See infra Part I. 
28 See R.E. Kopp et al.， Potential Surprises:・CompoundExtremes and Tipping Elements， 
in U.S. GLOB. CHANGE REs. PROGRAM， supra note 5， at411， 412， available at htps:l/sci-
ence20 17 .globalchange.gov /downloads/CSSR_ Ch 15 _PotentiaCSurprises. pdf， htps:l/perma 
.cc/2AV8・J59Q.
29 Hayhoe et a1.， supra note 20， at149. 
30 See Jm王NRAWLS， A THEORY OF JUSTICE 17 (Harv. U. Pres， rev. ed. 1971) (hereinafter 
RAWLS， 1971 ed.) (“At any time we can enter白巴 originalposition， so to speak， simply by 
following a certain procedure， namely， by arguing for principles of justice in accordanc巴 with
these restrictions [on certain knowledge]."). 
31 See id. at 10. For a critique of Rawls' reliance on rationalism， se，巴.gAMARTYA SEN， 
THE IDEA OF JUSTICE (Harv. U. Pres 2009); ROSEMARY LYSTER， CLIMA百 JUSTICE& DrsAs 
TER LAW (Cambridge U. Pres 2015). For a critique ofrationalism's particularly negative efect 
on eforts to achiev巴climatejustice， se Grear， supra note 26， at102-33 
32 See iψ'a Section IV.C. Earth Jurisprudence is a field of law血atseks to gi ve greater 
consideration to nature by “recognizing出巴 interconn巴ctednessof Earth's natural systems， the 
inherent rights and value of nature， and the dependence of humanity on alliving beings on a 
healthy Earth." See， e.g・， CTR. FOR EARTH JURIS.， http://www.earthjurist.org[https:l/perma.cc/ 
UP25・6QTE](last visited Feb. 3， 2018); Princ伊lesof Environmental Justice， FfRST NATL 
PEOPLE OF COLOR ENVL. LEADERSHIP SUMMIT (Oct. 1991)， htps:l/www.吋net.org/吋/principles
.html [htps:l/perma.cc/5HKE-2VT2]. 
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righting historica1 injustices whi1e setting us on the course to construct a 
society that is intimate1y aware of its eco1ogica1 1irnits. 
This Article concludes由ateffecting a just society-one that ensures 
the rights of al and particu1ar1y the most vu1nerable-in an end1ess1y chang-
ing climate demands a deep and concerted inquiry into which theories and 
structures can support socia1 justice and civi11iberties over time. A ful reci-
tation of this theory of justice and the undergirding princip1es are beyond the 
scope of this article. The article does suggest， however，血atother， well-
articu1ated phi1osophies or paradigms hint at what that organizing theo可
rnight be. Some critics rnight suggest that successfully introducing these 
processes and paradigms is infeasib1e， especially given the current po1itica1 
climate. It is， however， much easier to do由annavigate the alternative: a 
future in which we she1ter in a dated and flawed 1ega1 architecture as we 
attempt to weather 21st century superstorms. 
The article proceeds as follows. Part 1 teases out the assertion that cli-
mate change is as much a geosociopolitical phenomenon as it is a geophysi-
cal one. It a1so describes the way in which climate change's disproportionate 
impacts negative1y affect indigenous communities， the poor， and peop1e of 
co1or. This is the fodder for climate justice scho1ars， who have not on1y ilu-
rninated disproportionate impacts but have a1so provided sophisticated ana1・"
yses of the historica1 arc of contempor訂 yclimate vulnerability and 1aw's 
comp1icity in effectuating them.33 
P紅 t1 de1ves into the challenges climate rnigration presents to the 1aw 
and argues that they demonstrate climate impacts' broader threat to the foun-
dations of our jurisprudence. The breadth of 1aws imp1icated in climate rni-
gration scenarios is notab1e and unwie1dy. Further， phenomena 1ike the 
potentia1 tota1 10ss of habitabi1ity present nove1 1ega1 questions that have so 
far yie1ded a cacophony of inconclusive responses.34 C1imate rnigration a1so 
p1aces the 1aw's unfinished work-its inabi1ity to correct inequities i凶tiated
by co1onia1ism and pe叩etuatedby neo1iberalism-in sharp re1ief. 
P訂 t11 exp10res the no-ana1ogue future and its imp1ication for 1awmak-
ing， specifical1y environmenta1 1aw. Borrowing from eco1ogy， this section 
exp10res climate change as a regime or state shift for our globa1 ecosystems 
as well as our current Westpha1 
33 See， e.g.， Grear， supra note 26， at102-33; Humphreys， supra note 21， at136. See 
generally Carmen Gonzalez， Global Justice in the Anthropocene， in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
AND GOVERNANCE FOR 四 E州市ROPOCE阻 223(Louis J. Kotze， ed.， 2017). 
34 See e.g.， Burkett， supra note 14. 
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ofna加re，a point at which the complete lack of clarity regarding the state of 
the future requires a reflective process， one that is not only timely but 
compulsory . 
Part IV suggests theoretical frameworks that might produce a durable 
theoηof justice in an endlessly shifting climate regime. It does not seek to 
answer a fraction of the questions that might arise. It does seek to forward a 
notion， deemed radical by some， that rethinking our relationship with nature 
and the ecological bottom-line are foundational principles for this new the-
ory of justice. One of the most compelling popular refrains in the lead up to 
the Paris Agreement was this: the efforts to紅restglobal warming are not a 
defense of nature， but an expression of nature defending itself.35 This base 
ethos， which seeks not to“other" people nor the environment is echoed 
across ethical frameworks， moral philosophy， and even pockets of the legal 
academy-across cultures and over time. It satisfies the justice-seeking ori~ 
entation of climate justice scholars who understand that legal principles and 
structures出atsanction a political economy consistently acting beyond the 
limits of ecology (as well as the limits of equality and civil liberties) are 
intimately related and ultimately unviable. 
I. THE GEOPHYSICS AND GEOSOCIOPOLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
A. Climate Change as Physics and Politics 
Through regularly published reports， the authoritative sources of cli-
mate change science detail the profound impacts of our carbon-based politi-
cal economy on the global environment. The reports not only tel the story of 
the current and future geophysical impacts of climate change but also reveal 
出egeosociopolitics behind certain actors' access to and use of power.36 Each 
time the Intergovemmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCCワ37releases a 
comprehensive assessment， preeminent physical and social scientists de-
scribe with great clarity and authority climate change' s current and， to the 
extent knowable， future impacts with increasing urgency戸 TheAssessment 
35 τ百ThiおSI凶st批he巴informa1 slogan 0ぱft批hep伊op仰u山l加a紅rclima蹴t旬ej阿u凶削帥I路凶刷sは叫山tic附化悶ω巴movem間n田1児巴叩n凶ltand was t恥het匂a勾.g1ine 
of 
tωur，陀巴 Game mobilized for the児巴 Paris UNFCCC meetings. See CLIMA百 GA阻 s，https://www 
.facebook.comJclimategames/ [https://perma.cc/7BEB-3L3Q] (last visited Mar. 4， 2018). See 
also Matt McDona1d， The 'Climate Games' Aren 't Just Activist Stunts-They're Politics Be-
yond the UN， CONVERSATION (Dec. 9， 2015)， https://theconversation.comJthe-climate-games-
arentサust-activist-山 nts-出eyre-politics-beyond-肱 -unδ1872[https://perma.ccN4π-Z9LR]. 
36 Her巴 1use “power" in at 1east two different ways-to describe fosi1-fue1 powered 
e1ectrons or uneven heft at the int巴mationa1negotiations tab1e. 
37 Estab1ished by the World Meteoro1ogica1 Organization and the United Nations Environ-
m巴ntPrograrnme (UNEP) in 1988， the IPCC is the intemationa1 body for assessing the science 
re1ated to climate change. It provides to policymakers regu1ar assessm巴ntsof出esci巴ntific
basis of climate change， itsimpacts and future risks， and options for rnitigation and adaptation. 
See IPCC， http://www.ipcc.ch [h口ps://perma.cc/2GE9-3P8F].
38 The IPCC has prepared five Assessment Reports.τbey pub1ished the First Assessment 
R巴portin 1990 and出巴 sixthReport wil be re1eased in 2022.τb巴 mostrecent Fifth Assess-
454 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 53 
Reports， which reflect international scientific consensus， distill and summa-
rize current understandings of anthropogenic climate change. Consistent 
with the Global Change Research Act of 1990，39the U.S. publishes a similar 
document that specifically details understandings and impacts for U.S. 
states， territories， and affiliated islands.40 The pub1ished climate projections 
are not hyperbolic. Rather， because they are consensus documents based on 
peer-reviewed articles， the reports are conservative and time-delayed in their 
accounts of the state of the c1imate. In other words， the documents do not 
reflect outlier projections nor those pub1ished at the time of the reports' re-
lease. Nonetheless， the documents produce remarkable findings， namely the 
unequivocal con仕ibutionof human activity to climate change through the 
large-scale combustion of fossil fuels and widespread deforestation41 and the 
significant disruption to current socioe∞nomic systems and the 1ives and 
1ivelihoods' of human and non-human communities that are occurring or 
forecast to result. 
In addition to summarizing the (always bleaker) climate prognosis， the 
reports underscore the dynarnic nature of climate change by detailing posi-
tive feedback loops. These feedback loops are self-reinforcing cycles that 
accelerate climate change and increase the like1ihood of potential abrupt 
and/or irreversible su中rises.42With very high confidence， report authors cite 
at least two types of potential surprises:“compound events" in which multi-
ple extreme c1imate events occur simultaneously or sequentially and “criti-
cal threshold" or “tipping point event" in which the climate system crosses 
a threshold that leads to large impacts.43 Whether to chronicle melting Arctic 
icecaps or erosive flooding along coastal corridors， some commentators refer 
to the impacts of this dynarnic change as由e“newnormal."44 That descrip-
ment Report， releas巴din 2014， stated that由巳 warmingof the climate system “is unequivocal" 
and that it is“巴xtremelylikely" (95-100%) that human influence has been the dominant cause 
ofthe obs巴rv巴dwarming since th巴mid-20thCentury. IPCC， Climate Change 2013: The Physi-
cal Science Basis， in IPCC FIFTH ASSESSMENT REpORT 3-32 (2013). 
39 Global Change Research Act of 1990， 15 U.S.C. . ~ 2921 (2016). 
40 The Global Change Research Act of 1990 mandates that白eU.S. Global Research Pro-
gram prep紅 eand submit a Quadrennial Assessment to the President and Congress. 15 U.S.C. 
~ 2936 (2016). The Assessment， among other things，“analyzes the effects of global change on 
the natural environment， agriculture， energy production and use， land and water resources， 
transportation， human health and welfare， human social systems， and biological diversity." Id. 
41 D.J. Wuebbles et al.， supra note 5. 
42 See Kopp et al.， supra note 28， at411 (“[Positive feedbacks] have th巴 potentialto 
accelerate human-induced climate change and even shift the Earth's climate system， inpart or 
in whole， into new states出atare veηdifferent from those experi巴ncedin the recent past (for 
example， ones with greatly dirninished ice sheets or different large-scale pattems of atrnos-
ph巴r巴 orocean circulation).ウ.
43 D.J. Wuebbl巴set al.， supra note 5 
44 See， e.g.， Oliver Milman， Hurricanes and Heatwaves: Stark Signs of Climate Change 
'New Normal'， GUARDIAN (Dec. 28， 2017)， https://www.theguardian.comlenvironmentJ2017/ 
dec/28/climate-change-20 17 -warmest-year-extreme-weather [https://perma.ccI78WM-
BWK6]. But see David Wallace-Wells， This Isn't 'the New Normal' for Climate Change-That 
Will be Worse， N.Y. MAG. (Oct. 1，2017)， http://nymag.comldaily/intel1igencer/2017/1O/why-
this-isnt-the-new-normal-for-climate-change.htrnl [htps:/p巴rma.cc尻AJ6・559A].
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tion， however， isboth discomfiting and misleading. Climate change is not a 
static phenomenon producing a definitive and steady， however new and un-
familiar， normal. Rather， the consequences of climate change will not only 
intensify but continually shift as average global temperatu配 increasesover 
time. Further， the rate of change is increasing.45 1n sum: more significant 
change， more swiftly. 
The geophysics of climate change has implications for socioeconornic 
and political organization at al levels， as does the failure to appreciate the 
singularly unique challenge it presents as it proceeds in its inexorable (and at 
times stochastic) upward trend. Melting glaciers， ex仕emestorms， rising sea 
levels， and ocean acidification are already evident with concornitant impacts 
to the economy and demographic composition of cities， states， and coun-
tries.46 For example，“the incidence of daily tidal flooding is accelerating in 
more th阻 25Atlantic and Gulf Coast cities. "47 Sea levels may rise by one to 
four feet by 2100-and a rise of eight feet“cannot be ruled OUt."48 Heat 
waves， large forest fires， and chronic and prolonged drought are evident and 
increasing.49 
Because of its causes and effects， and the deeply lopsided nature of 
them，50“climate change" is a political term as well as a scientific one. As 
early as 2001， the 1ntergovemmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC") 
stated，“Developing countries tend to be more vulnerable to climate change 
. . [andJαre expected ωs~酔r more adverse impacts than developed coun-
tries . . . . Within regions or countries， impacts are expected to fal most 
heavily， inrelative terms， on impoverished persons.吋 1 The lived experience 
-.of climate change and one's vulnerability to it is also a consequence of his-
torical and systemic inequality. It reflects a series of decisions and differen-
tial inputs by state and private actors across geographic and temporal 
timescales.52 The impacts of atmosphere-altering emissions may not have 
been intentional but are consequential nonetheless. Further， there has been 
45 See D.J. Wuebbles et al.， supra note 5， at14 (“Forcing due to human activities . . . has 
become increasingly positive (warming) since about 1870， and has grown at an accelerated 
rate since about 1970."); id. at 24 (“Positive feedbacks (self-reinforcing cycles) within the 
climate system have出巴 potentialto acelerate human-induced climate change and even shift 
由巳 Earth'sclimate system[.]") 




50 See， e.g.， STEPHANE HALLEGATIE ET AL.， SHOCK WAVES: MANAGll叩 THE!MPACTS OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE ON POVERTY (World Bank 2016)， available at https://openknowledge.world 
b飢k.org/bitstr，巴amlhandle/10986/22787/9781464806735. pdf?sequence = 13&isAllowed = y 
[https://perma.cc/S463-227Q] 
51 IPCC， supra note 7， at70ー71.See also PIYA ABEYGUNAWARDENA ET AL.， AFRICAN 
DEV. BANK ET AL.， POVERTY AND CLIMATE CHANGE 5 (2013) ("[T]he countries with th巴
fewest resources arl巴likelyto bear the greatest burden of climate change in terms of los of life 
組 drelative efect on investment and economy."). 
52 See， e.g.， Maxine Burkett， Justice and Climate Migration， inCLiMATE REFUGEES: BE-
YOND THE LEGAL !MPASSE? 72 (Simon Behrman & Avidan Kent eds.， 2018). 
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significant advocacy for alternative political economies. In other words， a 
less carbon intensive economy has been possible for decades，53 and nations 
had the opportunity to respond to climate change with more reasonable alter-
native conduct.54 
B. Climate Justice and the Unfinished Work of the Law 
Current legal structures and under1ying principles faci1itated， ifnot ac-
tively produced， both the significant disruption to global atmospheric chem-
istry as well as the erratic and uneven vulnerability to its effects. Climate 
justice scholars advance trenchant arguments on this point by analyzing， for 
example， law's structural complicity in the differing outcomes and forecasts 
for the poor and people of color戸 Thesecritiques often note出atthe very 
design of the law， particularly the centra1ity of the co叩orateform and its 
interests， isfundamentally predisposed to environmental degradation-and 
indifferent， atbest， to inequitable human outcomes.56 Other scholars criticize 
the international community's failure to clearly establish the duties that re-
spond to the rights claims of those who disproportionately suffer from 
others' overuse of the global commonsY Theories pertinent to this debate 
include those of c1imate reparations and non-repetition， which counsels 
againstremedies白atrisk repeating the initial injury.58 Arguments about how 
to solve the problem reveal the biases and limitations in the law's current 
abi1ity to right climate wrongs. 
Climate justice is the field由atattends to the direct relationship be-
tween social inequality and environmental degradation resulting from cli-
53 See， e.g.， Frank Biennann & Rainer Brohm， Implementing the Kyoto Protocol Without 
the United States: The Strategic Role of Energy Tax Adjustments at the Border， 4 CLIMATE 
POL'y 289， 289-302 (205). See also Naomi Klein， Edward Said Lecture: 'Let Them Drown: 
The Violence of Othering in a Warmer World，' YOUTUBE (May 25， 2016)， https:llwww.youtube 
.comJwatch?vヨhLEtIu4iY.τbisasertion consciously echoes what other scholars and public 
intelectuals have said on the matt巴r.We cal this出巴“Anthropocene，"but出isis one version 
of what the human fotprint on its environment might have ben. This was not an inevitable 
byproduct of白巴 humanexperience. 
54 See， e.g.， Maxine Burkett， DuりIand Breach in an Era of Uncertainty: Local Govem-
ment Liability for Failure ωAdapt ωClimate Change， 20 GEO. MASON L. REv. 775 (2013). 
55 See， e.g.， Humphreys， supra note 21; Grear， supra note 26; Gonzalez， supra note 3. 
56 See， e.g.， Grear， supra note 26， at106 (citing STEPHEN京JRNER，A GLOBAL ENVIRON-
ME肝 ιRIG町(1sted. 2013)) (explaining伽 t“separatelegal personality， limited liability，出巴
S巴parationbetween ownership and control of corporations， and the legal duty placed upon 
company directors to pursue the comp加 y'sbest interests as a profit-making entity are key 
structural juridical reasons why environmental legal responses fail with respect to meeting 
important accountability targets for modes of environmental degradation."). 
57 See Marcus Hedahl， Directional Climate Justice: The Normative Relationsh伊between
Moral Claim Rights and Directed Obligations， 5 J.HUM. RTS. & ENV'T 35 (2014). 
58 See， e.g.， Maxine Burk，巴t，Climate Reparations， 10 MELBOURNE J. OF lNTL L. 509 
(2009) [hereinafter Burk巴t，Climate Reparations]; Maxin巴Burkett，Reconciliation and Non-
Repetition: A New Paradigm for f¥介ican-AmericanReparations， 86 UR. L. REv. 9 (2007) 
[hereinafter Burkett， Reconciliation and Non-Repetition]. 
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mate change.59 The field is intentionally integrative in its approach by 
embracing the unfinished work on correcting historical injustices and ad-
vancing preferred futures， while remaining mindful of the systemic chal-
lenges at hand. It resists， by definition， the law's predilection toward 
則的ingcompartmentalization， particularly at moments like this one when 
functioning systems and integration are essential to meet systemic and en-
tangled climate impacts. Informed by post-colonial and criticallegal scholar-
ship， as well as environmental justice principles that emerged in the late 20th 
century， climate justice scholars are clear-eyed about the limitations and ac-
tive obstacles contemporary law present. This section engages a few of the 
most s出kingarguments. 
Climate justice scholars and advocates seek to address the convergence 
of two realities-the contemporary political economy and increasing rates of 
change-and recognizes both as the culmination and amplification of other 
nagging justice problems colliding over time.60 In his article Climate Justice: 
The Claim 01 the Past， Stephen Humphreys notes出atclimate change actu-
ally raises few new questions. Rather， climate ch組 ge，“intensifiesand exac-
erbates existing patterns."61 In other words，“the most vulnerable to climate 
change are most vulnerable for a reason."62 Humphreys notes some of the 
component parts of the convergence of climate i吋usticewith other injus-
tices， stressing the ways its inequitable impacts implicate， among other 
things:“human rights that紅 eunenforced， unsubstantiated， even unarticu・
lated; path-dependence on an ever-expanding global economy that has al-
ready outgrown its resource base even as it polarizes wealth; a complicated 
international legal architecture that apparently sustains and rewards the sta-
tus quo; [and] political inertia戸 3Climate justice scholars and advocates 
reveal and seek to address these convergences and collisions so the most 
vulnerable to climate change might not only survive but， optimistically， 
thrive in a post-climate era.64 
59 For a discussion of the developm巴ntof th巴fieldof climate justice， se Maxine Burkett， 
Just Solutions to Climate Change: A Climate Justice Proposal for a Domestic Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism， 56 BUFF. L. REv. 169， 188 (2008). 
60 1 have more comprehensively紅 guedthis point elsewhere. See， e.g.， Burkett， supra note 
52. Other scholars have made similar and compelling points. See Grear， supra note 26， at126 
(“sustained凶 ectionon climateゆ sticepoints us directly to配 historicaland contempor町
production of th巴asymmetricrelations of n巴oliberalglobalization and to血edistinctively pat-
temed relationship between corporate juridical privilege and climate change as a crisis of 
human hierarchy.") (emphasis in original). 
61 Humphreys， supra note 21， at138. 
62Id. 
63Id. at 136 (quotations omitted). 
64 For a developed explication of the post-climate era， se Burk，巴t，supra note 12， at1. 
There， 1 argu巴:
Our血oroughreworking of our environment wil necessarily impact the legal， politi-
cal， and economic syst巴msin which白eyw巴reconceived， developed， and globalized. 
At白ismoment in geological history， when the impacts of climate change紅巳 in-
creasingly palpable and understood， 1 suggest出atwe are embarking on a post-cli-
mate era in law and human society. 
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Indeed， a community' s exposure to extreme events is not the sole deter-
minant of its vulnerability to climate change impacts.65 The strength of its 
natural and synthetic systems-of economy and governance， for example-
and its ability to adapt to the impacts of climate change are also critically 
important. For example， itis not a coincidence or sad irony that those least 
able to adapt to rising sea-levels were also colonized by European empires.6 
Aaron Saad specifically identifies colonial policy， cold war politics， and 
structural adjustment programs as mechanisms that-incidentally at best-
locked in vulnerability to climate change.67 Climate justice framing， he 
maintains， insists出atany efforts to respond and redress these vulnerabi1ties 
must direct1y address such historical injustices.68 
To adequately respond and redress requires， then， an investigation of 
law's structural complicity in climate i吋ustice.Scholars like Anna Gre訂
seek to advance climate justice by addressing the “silo-like separation of 
legal taxonomies."69 Grear acknowledges the unprecedented global com-
plexity of climate change， which is arguably a test for even the best con-
ceived and executed legal systems. She also notes， however， that出e
“organization of law itself' exacerbates the challenge for governing princi-
ples and institutions as they exist today.70 The law espouses linear views of 
causation， bounded domains， and territorial jurisdictional parameters that are 
incapable of addressing climate change's boundary crossing effects and dis-
In this period， the human systems出atdeveloped under白巴 relativelystable c1imate 
wil confront cha11enges to their baseline assumptions and rules of p紅白ipation.I 
suggest that an appropriately unified and thorough post-c1imate白eorywil 
eml巴rge.. . [I]n the post-c1imate era， our legal systems wil not be immun巴 to
dramatic change. Indeed， those early signs of disparate critique紅 eemerging first-
perhaps unsurprisingly-in出eenvironmental and intemationa1 law紅'enas.
65 For further discussion of c1imate chang巴 vulnerabilityas巴ssments，se A Framework 
for Climate Change Vulnerability Assessments， WEADAPT (Dec. 4， 2014)， https://www.we 
adapt.orglknowledge-base/vuln巴rability/climate-change-vulnerability-assessments[htps:/per 
ma.ccI2E7E-Z7MR]. 
66 See， e.g.， Aaron Saad， Toward a Justice Frameworkfor Understanding and Responding 
to Climate Migration and Displacement， 10 ENVTL. JUST. 98 (2017). For a discusion of post-
colonial impacts on出egloba1 economy， intemational environmental and economic law， and 
由巳 North-SouthDivide， se氾， e.g.， Attapattu & Gonza1ez， supra note 25; M. Rafiqul Islam， 
Hisωη of the North-South Divide in International Law: Colonial Discourses， Sovereignη， 
and Self-Determination， inINTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH 23 
(Shawkat Alam et al. eds.， 2015); Shawkat Alam & Jona Razzaqu巴，Sustainable Development 
versus Green Economy:・TheWay Forward?， inIN百 RNATIONALENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND 
THE GLOBAL SOUTH， supra， at609. 
67 Saad， supra note 66， at100 (“The nature of the wrong here is白紙血eability of some 
actors to adapt to c1imate chang巴 islow due to historical legacies of injustice， which would 
includ巴 thoseof colonia1 policy (econornic underdevelopment， weak govemance s凶 ctures，
arbitrary borders， poor infrastructure)， Cold War po1itics (e.g.， destabilizing and/or deposing 
democratica11y elected regimes， proxy wars， small arms pro1iferation)， and neolibera1 structura1 
adjustrnent programs (defunding of白 pub1icsector， structura11y disadvantageous trade agre-
ments白紙 lockin underdevelopment).ワ.
68Id. 
69 G問紅，supra note 26， at105. 
70Id. at 104. 
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proportionately negative impacts on the poor and people of color.71 lndeed， 
Grear warns against problem-solving strategies that tum to a “strong rule of 
law" because climate injustice results from structural inequities that relevant 
fields of law have advanced， including co中oratelaw and intemational eco-
nornic law.72 To support that bold assertion， Grear cites the persistence of 
colonialism and its role as a progenitor of the unassailable and uniquely 
intimate relationship between the co中orationand ultimately vulnerable peo-
ples or environments. Citing Tumer and Sinden， Grear notes the enduring 
primacy of the corporate form and shareholder profits over environmental 
integrity.73 
Colonialism' s legacy of exploitation fundamentally predisposes the con-
temporary political economy to degradation， a predisposition that is now 
baked into the global economy. According to climate justice scholar Carmen 
Gonzalez， modem investrnent law inherited from the colonial era an instru-
mentalist view of the environment that justified a right of resource exploita-
tion. This right has no corresponding duty “to protect the health of local 
ecosystems， enhance the wel1-being of local comrnunities， or advance the 
goals and interests of the host state."74 lndeed， Gonzalez's review of the 
historical role of colonialism， contemporary bilateral investments， and robust 
institutional arrangements supported by ins汀umentslike the 1947 General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT agreement) and the export-led poli-
cies of the lntemational Monetary Fund and World Bank，75 demonstrate the 
structural complicity of the law， which was and remains at base a reflection 
of power and hierarchy.76 
71 Id. at 105. 
72 Id. at 106 (arguing血atc1imate injustice “is a manifestation of a structura1 patho1ogy in 
which 1aw itse1f is central."). 
73Id. at 106， 114 (identifying the juridica1 privi1eging of the ear1y transnational corpora司
tion as being decisive in血eimposition of European co1onia1 imperia1ism). 
74 Gonza1ez， supra note 3， at23. 
75 Id. at 25. 
76 See id. at 223-27. See generally Pi巴reSch1ag， The AnxieりIof the Law Student at the 
Socratic Impasse-An Essay on Reductionism in Legal Education， 31N.Y.U. L. REv. & Soc. 
CHANGE 575 (2007) (describing structures of 1egal education伽 treplicate hierarchy). Much 
has been writen about the structural complicity of 1aw in the context of racial hierarchy. See， 
e.g.， Natsu Tay10r Saito， Tales of Color and Colonialism:・RacialRealism and Settler Colonial 
Theoη， 10 FLA. A & M U. L. REV. 1， 2 (2014). In白econtext of feminist 1ega1 theory and 
intimate vio1ence， se Maxine Eichner， On Postmodem Feminist Legal Theoη，36 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1， 1 (201); Judith Arrnata， Getting Beyond the Law's Compliciηin Inti-
mate Violence Against Women， 3WILLAMETIE L. REv. 773， 74-75 (197). In the context of 
corporate and environmental 1aw， se， e.g.， Grear， supra not巴 26，106-08 (quoting 買JRNER，
supra note 56， at32) (“[T]he very design of the 1aw itse1f is fundamentally predisposed to 
environmenta1 degradation and forms part of a dysfunctiona1 g10bal 1ega1 architecture which 
cannot achieve environmental sustainability."). Grear further emphasizes白atthe very nature 
of白ecorporation with “a sep紅 ate1egal personality， limited liability， the sepぽ ationbetween 
ownership and contro1 of corporations， and the 1ega1 duty p1aced upon company directors to 
pursue the company's best interests as a profit-making entity"間 presentsa manifestation of 
s回 ctura1comp1icity in the 1aw and “are key structura1 jurisdictional reasons why environmen-
ta1 1egal response fail with respect to meeting important acountability tぽgetsfor modes of 
environmenta1 degradation." Id. at 106 (citing TuRNER， supra note 56， at32). 
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Natural capital and fussy valuations of ecosystem services confirm the 
primacy of the market and co中oratelaw “as the metastructure dominating 
al other structures."77 The Anglo-American co叩orateform is now ubiqui-
tous， and is as relevant to China as it is to the U.S. today. Further， and in 
anticipation of arguments to make the business case for climate action or 
celebrations of“environmentally-facing corporations，" the creation of profit 
serves as a backstop to achieving environmental integrity戸 Accordingto 
Grear， the excesses of the market have合iventhe eco-destructive global cli-
mate crisis. She maintains，“[n]ot only is there a fundamental misalignment 
between the complexity of climate crisis and the law's reductive tendencies， 
but law's ideological structure (its deep intimacy with capitalism and its 
commitment to the centrality of由eco叩orateform) renders law a paradoxi-
cal tool at best."79 Therefore， itis counterintuitive and counterproductive to 
place faith in markets and the undergirding legal structure alone to change 
the current course of global change. 
Law's systematic privileging of the corporation-a disembodied， incor-
poreal juridical form-stands in sh抑 co附 astto出eprototypical subjects of 
climate injustice-women， children and other marginalized human groups， 
and living ecosystems.80 Further， and particularly relevant to cross-border 
climate migration discussed in greater depth in P紅 tH， Grear notes that 
“while the globalized world remains perilously ful of policed borders， state-
co中oratesurveillance and other forms of bodily control for vulnerable . . 
human beings， the globalized world remains relatively borderless for corpo・
rate capital."81 Unsurprisingly， Grear prescribes a full-bodied response to 
this incoherence and includes， among other things， a call to“re-engineer" 
the co中orationand challenge the context of its dominance.82 
Grear calls for a commitment to the hopeful visions of climate justice 
as long as it is hitched to reflexive critique.83 Ultimately， she prescribes a 
radical reformulation of law “and its categories and processes" to achieve 
just and resilient futures.84 Such a reformulation would temper the Enlight-
ment's prim紅 yconcern with personal autonomy姐 dindividualism， allowing 
collaboration， social ties， and citizenship to flourish in the face of deeply 
threatening environmental degradation and accompanying di 
7 Gre訂 ，supra note 26， at108. 
78 Id. at 106. 
79Id. at 109. 
80Id. at 116-17. 
81Id. at 120 
82Id. at 128. 
83 Grear' s cal seems especialy rel巴vantto白is紅 tic1eas the succ巴sof my proposal is 
conu!1gent on a Rawlsian exercise that wil require rigorous critique. 
制 SeeGrear， supra note 26. See also Anna Grear & Conor G巴 紅ty，Choosing a Future: 
The Social and Legal Aspects of Climate Change， 5 J.OF HUM. RTS. & ENVT 1， 6 (2014). 
出 SeeKlaus Boss巴lman，Losing the Forest for the Trees: Environmental Reductionism in 
the 1品川 2SUSTAINABILITY 2424， 2431 (2010) (arguing that modemity has “nurtur[ ed] the 
idea that a healthy environment is secondary to individual wel-being"). 
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sis in public decision-making， such that those in power cease to resolve is鴫
sues with deep mora1 implications by simply using， for example， cost benefit 
analyses.86 
The mandate， therefore， for climate justice scholars is daunting while 
stil inchoate. This is true with respect to many elements of the existing legal 
regime， but need not present an insurmountable hurdle. Marcus Hedahl' s 
ana1ysis of the absence of corresponding duties to rights claims of climate 
justice advocates is especially valuable here.87 Hedahl dispenses with the 
notion that rights exist if and only if a corresponding directed obligation 
exists.8 His argument has significant implications， because for those most 
vulnerable to the most adverse effects of climate there are not yet speciι 
cally deterrnined and directed obligations to meet those rightS.89 For exam-
ple， there are myriad ethical considerations at play to deterrnine what 
constitutes one's fair share of the global commons and obligations to reduce 
ernissions. The global community has failed to formulate and settle upon an 
actionable response. But Hedahl argues that this“fair share" may already 
exist， merely awaiting discovery and， presumably， implementation. Sirni-
larly， what comprises a just response to a changing climate， inexorably 
changing with uneven and inequitable outcome， issirnilarly awaiting discov-
ery-and perhaps revealed， as this article argues， via a Rawlsian exercise. 
Our failure to set up a system to respond adequately to climate change 
rights claims further injures in two ways. First， itfails to prevent harm.90 
Second， it denies the injured the ability to engage meaningfully in delibera-
tions and deterrnination about those rightS.91“Not only can we wrong 
others，" according to Hedahl，“we can further wrong them by not creating 
specific and specifically addressed directed obligations."92 There is a secon-
dary obligation， therefore， to create or empower institutions to ensure “that 
there exist， in practice， concrete obligations correlative to these rights. 
(Though， of course， even the secondary obligation must be called forth; it 
doesn't exist， as such， in lawふ"93Again， this calling forth rnight take the 
form of a reflective deliberation behind the veil，94 
86 See id. (arguing that prevailing views about environmental policy“[reflect] a compart-
mentalized， fragmented， and economically charged idea of出eenvironment"). 
87 See generally Hedahl， supra note 57， at35 (providing such analysis). 
8 See id. at 35. 
89 See id. 
伺 Seeid. at 36. 
91 See id. 
92 Id. at 47. See also Burkett， supra note 52 (arguing that，“[g]iven the limitation of 
human rights law to respond adequately to巴nvironm巴ntaldegradation， the abs巴nceof clear 
巴nvironmentairights and duties is starker and more consequential. Not clearly defining envi-
ronmental duties， and their application in practice， is an aggravation"). 
93 See Humphreys， supra note 21， at142 (elaborating on Hedahl's mandate that duties be 
correlated to th巴 rightsof those vulnerable to climate change). 
94 For further discussion of the contemporary veil climate change introduces see infra 
Section IV.A. 
462 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 53 
11. CLIMATE MIGRATION， JUSTICE， AND FRAGMENTATION 
Few consequences of climate change demonstrate the current legal sys-
tem' s inability to affect climate justice than climate-induced migration. In 
addition to presenting novel legal issues， climate migration exposes and ap-
plies additional pressure to al of the unfinished work of our current legal 
regimes. Failures to address power-whether derived from fossil-derived 
electrons or resulting in uneven heft at the intemational negotiating table-
and historical con凶butionto both climate change and other communities' 
and countries' vulnerability to it are especially relevant to a discussion of 
climate migration. So far， a relative underappreciation of the climate's dis-
tinct nature as a geosociopo1itical driver of change has predominated. This 
presents a challenge to those seeking just solutions or， at the ve可 least，hop-
ing to avoid literal and figurative exile under the current migration regimes. 
An additional challenge inheres in climate migration's crosscutting na-
ture. Both intemal and cross-border movement implicate a notable breadth 
of laws and related institutions， agencies， and advocates. A cross-border mi-
gration might佐iggermultiple intemational law regimes， including human 
rights law， particularly civil and po1itical rights， humanitarian law， and refu-
gee law. Relevant， too， are related domestic laws on immigration and na-
tional security or implementing legislation that give effect to asylum 
agreements. For both cross-border migrants and the intemally displaced， 
property law， indigenous rights， and environmental laws might also apply. 
The number and diversity of relevant laws presents a coordination problem. 
It also reveals a crippling compartmentalization of related legal regimes at a 
time when convergence is peculiarly necessary. 
A. Climate Migration as Archetype 
The changes in climate affect al aspects of contemporary life95 while 
yielding and exacerbating new phenomena. The emergence of climate mi-
gration-displacement， migration， and relocation scenarios induced by cli-
mate change-is one archetypical effect. Climate migration i1ustrates well 
the inequitable outcomes caused by intersecting structures of subordination. 
95 See， eふ Climate Changeお Partof California's PelプセctRecipe for lntense Wildfire， 
PBS NEW HOURS (Dec. 13，2017，6:25 PM)， available at htps:/Iwww.pbs.org/newshour/show/ 
climate-change-is-part-oιca1ifomias-p巴rfect-recipe-for -intense-wi1dfire [https://perma.cc/ 
556N・M6E7];Phi1ip Bump， A Los Angeles-Houston World Series in Record Heat is a Litle-
on-the-Nose for 2017， WASH. POST (Oct. 25， 2017)， https://www.washingtonpost.comlnews/ 
po1i tics/wp/20 1 7/10/25/ a-1os-ange1es-houston-wor 1d -series-in-record -heat -is-a -1i t1e-on -the-
nose-for-2017I?utm_term = .57巴age5ec689 [htps:/peロna.cc/J7CC]; Micha巴1en Doucleff， 
Are There Zombie Viruses in the Thawing Permc.介'ost?，NPR (Jan. 24， 2018， 5:19 PM)， htps:/ 
www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2018/01/24/57 597 4220/are-there-zombie-viruses-Iトthe-
thawing-permafrost [https://perma.cc/ACX4-KWZ8]; Sar油 Kennedy，The WeirdReason Your 
Christmas Tree Might Be Shedding Needles， YALE CLIMATE CONNECTIONS (Dec. 22， 2017)， 
https://www.ya1eclimateconnections.org/20 17 /12/christmas-trees-s町ugg1巴ーin-changing-cli-
mate/ [https://perma.ccIL84H-JU5A]. 
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It also reveals the broader shortcornings of the current legal system's ability 
to effect climate justice. The forecasted intensity in climate change and the 
accompanying rate of change will continue to impact human rnigration， such 
that typically mu1ti-causal rnigration events will be more closely associated 
with climate change-related environmental degradation. In effect， rnigration 
traditionally known to resu1t from an entanglement of drivers (social， eco司
nornic， political) may soon have a predorninant and undeniably s住ongcli-
mate signal.96 Indeed， a recent study found that applications for asylum 
respond to temperature fluctuations，出at“hotter凶 than-normaltemperatures" 
are spu紅白gpeople to seek asylum in Europe today， and that the “net fore-
cast" is for asylum applications to increase in an accelerated fashion as 
global temperatures continue their upward trend.97 
Whether this distinct kind of rnigration resu1ts from extreme heat or the 
slow-onset impacts of sea level rise and heat， as is occurring in the Pacific，98 
or fast-moving and unimaginably large storms that leveled small islands and 
displaced tens of thousands in the Caribbean，99 the least responsible for 
global greenhouse gas ernissions are subject to the greatest disruption. In-
deed， as early as 1990， the IPCC warned that，“one of the gravest effects of 
climate change may be those on human rnigration."100 In 2014，出eIPCC put 
a finer point on the urgency of climate rnigration， noting that climate change 
is projected to increase the displacement of people throughout this century as 
risks of displacement increase when low-income or low-resourced popula-
tions experience“higher exposure to extreme weather events， in both rural 
and urban areas."101 
ー Enoughis known about the potential severity of climate rnigration to 
warrant a response.102 Although questions remain regarding the size and 
96 See Burkett， supra note 52 
97 See Anouch Missirian & Wolfram Schlenker， Asylum Applications Respond to Temper-
ature Fluctuations， 358 SCIENCE 1610， 1610 (2017). 
98 See Burkett， supra not巴 52.See also CTR FOR EXCELLENCE IN DISASTER MGT & Hu-
MANITARIAN ASSISTANCE， THE REpUBLIC OF百-IEMARSHALL ISLANDs: DISASTER MANAGE-
MENT REFERENCE HANDBOOK 10 (2016)， available at https://www.cfe-dmha.orglLinkClick 
.aspx?fileticket=pbyuANphrIg%3D&portalid=0 [https://perma.cc/6TPN-GXVD]; Losing 
Your Land to Climate Change， U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMMR， (Oct. 23， 2017)， 
http://www.ohchr.orgAN/NewsEventslPageslLosingLandtoclimatechang巴.aspx[htps:/perma 
.cclG4JA-HSX4]. 
99 See Burkett， supra note 52. See also In Florida， Puerto Ricans Displaced by Hurricane 
Maria Struggle to Adjust， CBS NEWS (Dec. 5， 2017， 7:48 AM)， https://www.cbsnews.coml 
news/puerto-ricans-relocat巴ーto-florida-fac巴-dificult-transition/ [htps:/p巴rma.cc/UWX8-
LNX4]. 
IOOIPCC， CLIMATE CHANGE: THE 1990 AND 1992 IPCC ASSESSMENTS 103 (J.T. Hough-
ton， G.J. Jenkins & J.J. Ephraums eds.， 1990)， available at https://www.ipcc.chlipccreports/ 
1992%20IPCC%20SupplementlIPCC_1990_and_1992_AssessmentsAnglish/ipcc_90_92_as 
sessmentsjar_fuILreport.pdf; [htps:/perma.c/NGXテMJ5Q].
10 IPCC， Climate Change 2014: Impacts， Adaptation， & Vulnerabil町，in IPCC FIFTI王
ASSESSMENT REpORT 20 (2014). 
102 One scholar states persuasiv巴Iythat“[i]t is not necessary for the causal link between 
. certain behavior and . . . significant environmental d巴gradationto be beyond doubt." 
Astrid Epiney， 'Environmental Re.ルgees':Aspects of International State Responsibility， in MI-
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scope of climate-induced population movements and whether “climate mi-
gration" is the right name， scholars and civil society have engaged in help-
ful， if at times contested， ¥03 efforts to bring greater clarity to this 
phenomenon. Across disparate discourses on climate migration， al agree to 
varying extents that， among other things， so-called “environmentally-in・
duced migration" is growing.104 Researchers also know出atthe majority of 
climate migrants， now and into the向田re，are internally displaced per-
sons¥05-those who are forced or obliged to flee their places of habitual resi-
dence within their country' s borders. ¥06 
Climate-induced cross-border migration， while producing fewer mi-
grants in total number， may present significant and unique challenges.107 Al-
though most widely referred to as “climate refugees，"108 the circumstances 
for these cross-border migrants do not typical1y p訂 al1elthose of political 
refugees.109 Consequent1y， they have no legal1y recognized definition at the 
international level or clear legal protections to which to appeal， constituting 
an additional injury with which they must contend. Other than the rare re-
gional agreements that recognize the environment， and in one instance cli-
mate change，l ¥0 as a driver of migration necessitating protection， most legal 
GRATION & CLIMATE CHANGE 407 (Eti巴nnePiguet， Antoine Pecoud， & Paul De Guchteneire 
eds.，20ll).τbe precautionary principle suggests that enough is known， given the current state 
of the social science to oblige states to take preventive measures as circumstances require. Id. 
103 See， e.g.， Lezlie C. Erway Moriniとre& Mohammed Hamza， Environment and Mobil-
iη.-A View介omFour Discourses， 41 AMBIO 795， 795 (2012). 
1倒 Id.at 804. See also KALIN & SCHREPFER， supra note 1， at22 (noting that白emagm-
tude of intemal displacement because of“c1imate change-related events and processes is sub-
stantia1 and likely to increase in出eforeseeable釦ωre").
105 See KALIN & SCHREPFER， supra note 1， at22; see also ELSADIG ELSHEIKH & HOSSE酎
AYAZI， HAAS INST.， MOVING TARGETS: AN ANALYSIS OF GωBAL FORCED MIGRATION (2017)， 
available at http://haasinstitute. berkeley .edu/si tesl defaul tlfiles/haasinstitu te _moving" targets_ 
globa1migrationreporcpublish_ web.pdf [https:llperma.cc/2BR9-2ETJ]. Desertification， for 
instance， has forced relocation for communities in the Gobi Desert to other parts of China. Id. 
at 28. 
1師 FrancisM. Deng (Representative of the U.N. Secretary-Gen巴ral)，Guiding Principles 
on Internal Displacement， U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2， at5 (Feb. 1， 1998). 
107 See， e.g.， KALIN & SCH阻 P回 R，supra note l， at24. During 2010 and 20ll， a s巴vere
drought， coupled with civil strife， produced a “mass exodus" of Somalis into Kenya， furth巴r
des帥，jlizingthe region. Vikram Kolmannskogg， D.N. High Comm'r for Re旬悶 (UNHCR)，
P01'y D巴ve10pmentand Evaluation Service， Climate Change， Disaster， Displacement and Mi-
gration.-Initial Evidence介omAfrica， at5-10 (Dec. 2009)， available at http://www.u曲 cr.orgl
4b18e3599.pdf [https:llperma.ccA6RH-N5MA]. 
108 This is true throughout media representations of the ph巴nomenon;see， e.g.， John Wen-
d1e， Syria's Climate Re.ルgees，SCI. AM.， Mar. 2016， at50; as w巴1as in grey literature; see， 
e.g.， ELSHEIKH & AYAZI， supra note 105， at 8-11. Ca11s in acadernic literature for a new 
category of refugee have not succeeded to date. See e.g.， Frank Biermann & Ingrid Boas， 
Preparing for a Warmer World.-Towards a Global Governance System to Protect Climate 
Refugees， 10 GLOB. ENVTL. POL. 60 (2010). 
109 For the basic d巴finitionof “refugee，" se巴 U.N.Conferenc巴 ofPlenipotentiaries on the 
Status of R巴fugeesand Stateless Persons， Final Act and Convention Relating to the Status 
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scholars understand that intemational refugee law does not provide protec-
tion in spirit or language. It is possible that c1imate migration can位igger
intemational refugee law' s protection， but that would occur in only two cir-
cumstances: (i) if authorities deny assistance or protection to certain people 
because of their race， religion， nationality， 0f membership in a particular 
social group when sudden-or slow-onset events occur and expose them to 
treatment tantamount to persecution or (i) if disputes over dwindling natural 
resources because of c1imate change resu1t in persecution白紙 targetsmem-
bers of the above c1assifications in situations of violence， conflict or serious 
human rights abuses.l1 
Nevertheless， the efforts to adapt existing or develop new and respon-
sive law and policy specific to c1imate migration have been slow to build. At 
the intemational level， parties did not affirmatively acknowledge and ad-
dress c1imate change and human mobility under the UNFCCC until twenty 
ye訂 safter the IPCC' s first statement on the matter.ll2 A “c1imate change 
displacement facility，"113 a more assertive effort proposed for inc1usion in 
the recent Paris Agreement， did not proceed over opposition from Australia， 
which preferred to“work c10sely with [their] Pacific partners on these im-
portant issues."114 Instead， the non-binding Paris Decision requested a task 
force to “deve10p recommendations for integrated approaches to avert， mini-
ing血atpartJes“should take protection m巴asuresand asist people who had been displaced 
internally due to natural disasters or caused by man， including climate change."). 
IIIKλLIN & SCH阻 PFER，supra note 12， at32-33. 
112 Paragraph 14(f) of the Cancun Decision ushered in that discussion within the broader 
adaptation eforts. Conference of the Parties to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate 
Change， Repon of the Conference of the Panies on Its Sixteenth Session， U.N. Doc. FCCC/ 
CP/201O/7/Add.l， at5 (Mar. 15，2011). For further discussion of the significance of this inclu-
sion of climate rnigration， see KλLIN & SCHREPFER， supra note 12， at50. Continu巴d，though 
cursory， efforts to understand climate's impact on rnigration followed in subsequent decisions， 
notably in Conference of the Parties to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change， 
Report ofthe Conference ofthe Panies on lts Eighteenth Session， U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2012/ 
8/Add.l， at22-23 (Feb. 28， 2013) and Conference of the Parties to白巴 U.N.Fram巴workCon-
vention on Climate Change， Repon of the Conference of the Parties on Its Twenty予rstSes-
sion， U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/l0/Add.l (2015) (adopting the Paris Agreement). 
113 In the course of the ye訂 leadingup to the Paris Agreement， climate-related displace-
ment was prorninent in draft texts. Early drafts of the agreement included a first-time elabora-
tion of a “climat巴 changedisplacement coordination facility: under the proposed loss-and-
damage provisions." See， e.g.， U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change， Draft Paris 
Outcome， U.N. Doc. FCCC/ADP/2015/L.6， at1 (2015).百lefacility would have assisted with 
coordinated efforts to address the needs of those displaced by climate-related extreme events 
and plan for organized relocation. See also Maxine Burkett， Reading Between Two Red Lines: 
Los and Damage and the Paris Outcome， 6 CUMATE L. 118 (2016); Jessica Wentz & Michael 
Burger， Designing a Climate Change Displacement Coordination Faciliか Keylssues for COP 
21， COLUM. L. SCH. SABIN CTR. CUMATE CHANGE L. 1-2 (2015)， http://columbiaclimatelaw 
.comlfiles/20 16/061W entz-釦 d-Burg巴r-2015-09-Displacem巴nt-Coordination-Facility.pdf
[htps:l伊 rma.cc厄WH9-VKS9].
14 Oliver Milman， UN Drops Plan to HeかMoveClimate-Change Affected People， 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 6， 2015)， http://www.th巴guardian.comlenvironm巴ntl2015/octl07 /un-drops-
plan-to-cr巴ate-group-to-
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mize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate."115 
Relevant regional agreements have also not proliferated. And， although the 
Guiding Principles on Intemal Displacement16 do not exclude climate 
change as a driver of intemal displacement， they also do not provide specific 
provisions to guide domestic decision-making. In any event， the Guiding 
Principles are soft law and， unlike the intemational and regional agreements 
mentioned， cannot bind state p紅 ties.With the notable exception of New 
Zealand and its recently proposed climate refugee visa， 117 governments on 
balance are reticent to erect new policy infrastructure to address climate mi-
gration. Expert groups and intergovernmental initiatives have made robust 
efforts at gap-filling 18 that may serve as important laboratories for address-
ing and arresting the worst possible outcomes. These initiatives may become 
especially important: The existing absence of political will to implement 
burden-sharing principles already leaves millions of asylum seekers in pre-
carious situations， with many languishing in camps or on remote and for-
saken islands.19 
The migration and relocation circumstances of small island developing 
states， such as the Pacific island states of Kiribati and出eU.S.-affiliated 
Republic of the Marshall Islands， present thornier challenges. Politicallead-
ers and legal scholars alike have raised questions regarding statelessness in 
response to the possible loss of habitable territory.120 Meanwhile， the island-
ers largely espouse a deep resistance to the notion that they are“sinking. "121 
15 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change， Adoption of出eP訂 isAgreement， '1 
50， U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP.20151L.9/R巴v.l(2015) 
16 U.N. Under-Secretary-Gen巴:ralfor Humanitarian Afairs and Emergency R巴liefCoor-
dinator， Guiding Principles on Intemal Displacement (2001)， http://www.u吐lcr.org/43celcff2 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/JVA7-A8TW]. 
17 Alex Randall， New Zealand Proposes Humanitarian Visafor 'Climate Rφ1gees'， DIP-
LOMAT (Nov. 30， 2017)， https://thediplomat.coml2017/111n巴w-zealand-propos巴s-humanita-
narトvisa-for-climat巴ーrefugees/[htps:/perma.cc/97W6-D25J] 
118 See generally Disaster-Induced Cross-Border Displacement， NANSEN lNrlATfVE (last 
visited Feb. 4， 2018)， https://www.nanseninitiative.org/[https://perma.cc/32GV-DHDF]. 
19 There are a number of examples throughout Europe， on Manus Island in Papua New 
Guin巴a，or along the US's south巴mconlInental border. See e.g.， Helen Davidson， Manus Hu-
manitarian Crisis a 'Damning Indictment' of Australia's RゆgeePolicy: UNHCR， GUARDIAN 
(Nov. 21， 2017) https://www.theguardian.comlaustralia-news/2017 /nov/22/manus-humanita-
rian-crisis-a-damning-indictment-of-australias-refugee-policy-unhcr [https://penna.cc/3KX3-
HQN2]. 
120 See Climate Change and Statelessness: An Overview， U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR 
REFUGEES (May 15， 2009)， http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a2dI89d3.htm1[htps:/per 
ma.cclNKT与YAEX].
12 For a striking， and popular， statement of Marshallese resistance to出enotion of inevita-
bility of migration，間 KathyJetnil阻ljner，Tell Them， KATHY JETNIL Ku阻R，htps:/ 
jki jiner. wordpress.coml20 1/04/13/tel-由eml[https://perma.cc/6C2Y・HPLK];Kathy Jetnil 
Kijner， Dear Matafele Peinam， KATHY JETNIL Ku阻 Rhtps:/jkijiner.wordpress.co凶 2014/09/
24/unit巴d-nations-climat巴-summit-opening-ceremony-my-poem-to-my-daught巴r/ [htps:/p巴r
ma.cc/8LFM-A9M5]. Walter Kalin， current Envoy of the Chair of the Platfonn on Disast巴r
Displac巴mentand fonn巴rR巴presentativeof the United Nations Secretary-Gen巴ra1on the 
Human Rights of Intemally Displac巴dPersons， provided five general scenarios血atmight 
entail climate-induced migration， including “ii) So-called ‘sinking' small island states." Water 
Kalin， Conceptualising Climate-Induced Displacement， inCUMAπCHANGE AND DISPLACE-
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恥1anyresidents of threatened islands eschew the “refugee" categorization 
and resist122 the inevitability of losing their lands-home to the bones of 
their ancestors and the birthplace of the next generation. Again， the existing 
international law is not straightforwardly transferable to contemporary cir-
cumstances of territorialloss. Specifically， the Convention on the Status of 
Stateless Persons， which defines a “stateless person" as one “who is not 
considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law，"123 does 
not on its face include the possible dislocation of al i-Kiribati or Marshal-
lese.124 It also does not immediately resolve the question of whether a state 
would cease to exist if it was no longer physically viable. Even if the Con-
vention were expansive enough to cover the circumstances of sirnilarly-situ-
ated low-lying and atoll nations (and had numerous signatories， which it 
does not)， the protection it provides is modest and， notably， is silent with 
respect to adrnission to another coun佐y.1251n sum， guarantees of civil and 
political rights for rnigrants， avenues to avoid marginalization of those rni-
grants， management challenges for host communities， and the responsibility 
of the international community， generally， remain undeterrnined and il-
defined. 
U.S. domestic relocation scenarios are equally illurninating and re-
sponses are equally undeveloped. From the Arctic to the Pacific Northwest 
to the恥但ssissippiDelta， climate-related relocation is necess紅 yand incipi-
ent. The U.S. federal government under the Obama Adrninistration， along 
with state and local p紅 tners，considered and began facilitating movement 
from high-risk areas.126 1n Louisiana， Is1e de Jean Charles is notable as the 
first kderally-supportedゃ communityto actively undergo planned reloca-
tion.127 Recognizing the significant loss of land-resulting from rising seas 
MENT 85 (J釦巴 McAdamed.， 2010). A number of Pacific island communities紅 eexp巴nencmg
dislocation because of dirninishing inhabitability of their islands. Before sea lev巴1rise caus巴S
the overtopping of the low-lying isl釦 ds，however， without significant intervention climate 
change impacts such as lack of fresh water and salinization of arable lands may stres the 
islands to an unmanageable degre. See Kenneth R. Weiss， Before We Drown We May Die of 
Thirst， 526 NATURE 624 (Oct. 29， 2015). 
12 Roger-Mark De Souza， Islands in Paris: New Climate Deal Gives Some Recognition to 
Humaniη's TruthBearers， NEW SECURITY BEAT (Dec. 16，2015)， https://www.news巴curitybeat
.org/20 15/ 12/islands-paris-climate-deal-recogni ti on-humani tys-tru th-bearers/ [https://perma 
.c/BH94-PAVL]. 
123 Conv巴ntionRelating to the Status of Stateles Persons， art. 1(1)， Sept. 28， 1954， 360 
U.N.T.S. 117 
124 See generalかJaneMcAdam， 'Disappearing States'， Statelessness and the Boundaries 
of Intemational Law， in CUMATE CHANGE AND DISPLACEMENT， supra note 119， at105 
(describing the novellegal isues raised by the physical disappearance of nations due to cli-
mate change). 
125 See generally Convention Relating to the Status of Stateles Persons， Sept. 28， 1954， 
360 U.N.T.S. 117 (outlining白estandards of treatment of stat巴lespersons once出eyhave 
taken up residence in a new stat巴);KAL悶&SCHREPFER， supra note 1， at27 
126 See discussion in Burkett， supra not巴 52.
127 Carolyn Van Houten， The First qがcialClimate Refugees in the U.S. Race Against 
Ti目me，NATL GEOGRAPHIC (May 25， 2016)， http://news.nationalgeographic.comJ2016/05/ 
160525 -isle-de-j ean -char les-louisiana -sinking -climate-change・refugees/ [https://perma.cc/ 
HU9T-2NS3]. See also Coral Davenport & Campbell Robe口son，Resettling the First Ameri-
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colliding with decades of channelization and oil and gas development-and 
the increased risk of staying in place as each hurricane season approaches， 
the Depぽtmentof Housing and Urban Development funded the relocation of 
island residents.128 This was a first for the U.S. government and a number of 
questions arose and will persist if the government assists more communities' 
moves to higher ground. Notable among them紅 e:Given finite resources， 
how do we decide between equally vulnerable communities?129 Which entity 
will fund it? And， how do people relocate in a way that affords them the 
opportunity to thrive? 
B. Justice and Climate Migration 
1n the U.S. and abroad， colonization's migration and mobility restric-
tions stifled active travel and resettlement that might be especially useful 
today. Tracey Skillington concludes， for example， that vulnerability to cli-
mate change was less irony than inevitability in the Pacific.130 Prior to colo-
nization， many communities lived in protected， high land areas to in large 
p訂 tprotect against sudden storms or flooding. Colonial authorities “en-
couraged" the establishment of coastal villages， thus increasing exposure.l3l 
Further， the notion of fixed boundaries is another colonial import into the 
region. N ational borders did not hamper movement within and between the 
‘sea of islands' in pre-colonial Oceania.132 1ndeed， according to Silja Klepp 
and Johannes Herbeck，“[t]his development transformed the common image 
of Oceania-up to白epresent day-into a set of isolated， vulnerable and 
distant island states， or‘islands in a far sea¥"133 1n the United States， settler 
colonia1ism has had a similarly devastating effect for indigenous communi-
ties-and for these communities' ability to adapt to or rebound from change. 
As Kyle Powys White explains， climate change in the indigenous context 
“refers veηspecifical1y to how industrial settler campaigns both dramati-
cally changed ecosystems， such as through deforestation， overharvesting and 
pollution; and obstructed indigenous peoples' capacities to adapt to the 
can ‘Climate Rそかgees'，N.Y. TIMES (May 3， 2016)， https:llwww.nytimes.coml2016/05103/us/ 
resettling-the-first-american-climate-refugees.html?action=c1ick&contentCollection=Ci-
mat巴&module= RelatedCoverage&region = Marginalia&pgtype=紅討c1巴.
128 Van Houten， supra note 127. See also UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND 
URBAN DEVELOPMENT， NATIONAL DrsAsTER RESILIENCE COMPETI百ONGRAN百 EPROFlLES 
7-10 (2016)， available at htps:lportal.hud.gov/hudportalldocuments/huddoc?id=NDRC-
GrantProf.pdf [https:llperma.ccIM5XG-JGBH]. 
四 Seee.g.， Eli Keene， Resources for Relocation: ln Search of a Coherent Federal Policy 
on Resettling Climate-Vulnerable Communities， 48τExAS ENVL. L. J. 1 (2018). 
130 See Tracey Skillington， Reconfiguring the Contours of Statehood and the Rights of 
Peoples of Disappearing States in the Age of Global Climate Change， 5 Soc. SCI. 46 (2016). 
13lld. 
132 Silja Klepp & Johannes Herb巴ck，The Politics of Enνironmental Migration and Climate 
Justice in the Pacific Region， 7 J.HUM. RTS. & ENVT. 54， 70 (2016). 
1331d. at 71. 
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changes， through removal and containment on reservations."134 The affront 
is contemporary as well: obstruction of indigenous responses persist not only 
in continued isolation and immobi1ty， but also by way of legal and diplo-
matic failures to prevent dangerous climate change and remove institutional 
barriers to adaptation within the confines of reservations.135 
The solutions to climate migration proffered to date have not， on bal-
ance， meaningfully engaged with the historica1 and contempo町 iniustices
animating the phenomenon. The sophisticated and well-coordinated efforts 
by entities like the Nansen Initiative136 are laudable， particularly given the 
rarnifications of the current legislative and regulatory void.137 Even if imper帽
fect， they advance a kind of“rough justice，"138 which is a worthy goal given 
the gravity of the circumstances. These actors suggest that economic devel-
opment or charitable efforts through humanitarian relief will adequately ad-
dress the uneven. impacts of climate change. The very frarning of the 
phenomenon as a developmental or humanitarian issue， however， elides jus-
tice claims and， according to Klepp and Herbeck，“impede[s] politicization 
of the discourse" on migration.139 Such apolitical approaches to problem-
solving may entrench suboptimal responses. The possible consequences of 
the govemment of Kiribati's“migration with dignity" strategy are illustra-
tive.l40 A significant part of their wisely multi-pronged approach to climate 
migration may exclude the most vulnerable.“Up-skilling" the population 
for foreign labor markets， per “migration with dignity" will likely favor a 
small percentage of young， educated， and middle司 andupper-class in 
Kiribati.14 
Finally， and significant1y， the elision of climate justice in the solutions 
proffered and executed is perhaps not surprising given its relative absence 
from the larger discourse on climate migration. Saad notes that the recog-
nized frarnings of environmental migrants noticeably do not include a cli-
134 Kyle Powys Whyte， Our Ancestors' Dystopia Now: Indigenous Conservation and the 
Anthropocene， in ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL HUMANIT1ES 206， 209 
(Ursula K. Heise， Jon Christ巴nsen，& Michelle Niemann ed.， 2016) (emphasis in original). 
135 Id. 
136 See THE NANSEN lNlTIATNE， https:llwww.nanseninitiative.org/[https://perma.cc/WGS 
3-CU4H]; see also 1 THE NANSEN lNrrrATIVE， AGENDA FOR THE PROTECTION OF CRoss-BoR. 
DER DISPLACED PERSONS IN THE CONTEXT OF DISASTERS AND CLIMATE CHANGE (2015) 
137 See e.g. Burkett， supra note 52 (discussing the legal void and arguing由atit typifies 
David Caron's出eoryon legal feedback mechanisms). 
138 For a relevant，discussion of rough justice in the climate justice context， s∞Maxine 
Burkett， Rehabilitation:・AP作ro叩'Poωsalfora Cα'lim叩1協叫aωteCompensation Me釘ch加am凹 nfor Small Island 
States， 13 SANTA CLARA J. lNTL L. 81 (2015) (exploring th巴 valuein developing a funding 
mechanism to respond to the consequences of climate change on small island states). 
139 Klepp & Herbeck， supra note 132， at59. 
140 Kayla Walsh， Kiribati Prepares for‘Migration with Digniη， to Confront the Ravages 
of Climate Change， WlRE (July 15，2017)， htps:/thewire.inlI57987Ikiribati-lTUgration-climat巴-
changel [htps:/perma.c尺JZQ6-Y9SE].
14 Klepp & Herbeck， supra note 132， at68 (“[s]everal interviewees in白erese訂 ch
infon凶ng出isarticle believe出atthe . . . strategy is likely to . . . work only for a small 
p巴rcentageof young，巴ducated，ITUdle-and upper-class I-Kiribatt'). 
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mate justice framing， which would tailor policy around the understanding 
that the environmental rnigrant is a wronged p紅 tydeserving of redress.142 
The absence of this frame， suggests that it is not yet prorninent or， as I would 
argue， sufficiently acknowledged in the current discourse.143 Employing a 
climate justice framework， however， would have palpable and meaningful 
outcomes for climate rnigration. Chief among these， according to Saad， is
dispensing with the victimlperpetrator dichotomy and replacing it with 
wronged or owed parties， on the one hand， and withholders of equitable 
relief on the other.l44 Further， introducing climate justice framing and ap-
proaches in the ups住eamdiscourse on climate rnigration would facilitate the 
decision maker' s ability to create and implement downstream responses that 
are more reparative than simply accomrnodating.145 
C. The Laws of Climate Migration and the Regulatoη Commons 
Climate rnigration within and across borders currently implicates myr-
iad legal fields as well as both hard and soft law.146 Some， especially human 
rights instruments， are obvious. The civil and political rights enumerated in 
the Intemational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR") are of 
particular relevance as provisions include the freedom to leave one's country 
and to enjoy reasonable protections as an alien in another.叩 TheIntema-
tional Convention on Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of their Farnilies rnight also have an effect.凶 Asthe subject of 
sovereign domestic affairs， intemal rnigrants are not covered by intemational 
conventions and do not enjoy specific protection provisions， but would ap-
peal to applicable standards of human rights laws such as provisions in Arti-
142 See Saad， supra note 66， at100. 
143 See id. 
144 See id. 
145 See Burkett， supra note 52. See also Saad， supra note 66， at100. Klepp and Herbeck 
make a similar point. They asert白at:
[A] post-colonial sensibility would imply由atresearch should aim to reveal the 
tendency of coun凶esof the global North not to acknowledge responsibility for白巴
social consequences of climate change. Such epistemic expansion-which can be 
read as a form of post-colonial methodological commitment to the reversal of past 
injustices (including血巴巴pistemic)might just open up new options for “hearingヘ
action and maneuvering space in the search for accountable and responsible migra-
tion and climate polici巴s.
Klepp & Herbeck， supra note 132， at73. 
146 Hard law imposes precise and binding obligations and delegates interpretiv巴authority
to a third party. In contrast， soft law can be formally non-binding or technically binding but 
conferring unlimited discretion on the parties， and/or lacking a third-party interpretation or 
implementation of the law. See Greg C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack， Hard vs. Soft law: Alter-
natiνes， Complements and Antagonists in Intemational Govemance， 94 M削 N.L. REv. 706， 
714-15 (2010). 
147 Intemational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 12-13， Dec. 16， 1966， 99 
U.N.T.S. 171. 
148 See generally Int巴rnationalConvention on Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families， Dec. 18， 1990， 2220 U.N.T.S. 3. 
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cle 12 of the ICCPR securing the liberty of movement and the freedom to 
choose one' s residence.149 Further， the 1998 Guiding Principles for the lnter-
nally Displaced are non-binding norms that extend protections for those 
moving within their country.150 Soft law instruments relevant to climate mi-
gration include the UN Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for 
Refugees and Displaced Persons (“the Pinheiro Principles")， the UN lnter-
Agency Standing Committee's Operational Guidelines on Human Rights and 
Natural Disasters， the Human Rights Council Resolution 7/23， 10/4， and 18/ 
22 on Human Rights and Climate Change， among others. These laws and 
statements of norms may not yield actionable or favorable results， but they 
are established and relevant. 
Sirnilarly， for domestic laws， the appropriate resolution of disputes is 
unclear， yet one can imagine the fields in which contest and remedy may 
arise. Those that attempt to cross borders into the United States wil1 have to 
contend with the shifting landscape of immigration law and civil rights for 
those with unresolved residence status. lnternally， communities like lsle de 
Jean Charles wil1 have property law questions that arise with respect to non-
possessory interests in evacuated lands， for example.15 
Other climate rnigration scenarios engage areas of law beyond the im-
mediately obvious. The kind of “statelessness" contemplated for the low-
lying and atoll nations， for example， isnot simply a statehood concern. It 
also implicates， among other things， the law of the sea and baseline deterrni圃
nations and principles of national identity and state responsibility. 152 
The dizzying breadth of laws and numerous spheres of governance and 
-related institutions that rnight direct futuie management of climate rnigration 
does not ensure the challenges presented wil1 be resolved. lndeed， the sheer 
number can result in a “regulatory commons" problem-a failure to manage 
149 Intemationa1 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 12， Dec. 16 1966，99 U.N工S.
171. See also KALII吋&SCHREPFER， supra note 1， at24. 
150 U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees， Guiding Principles on Intemal Displacement， 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/l998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 1， 198). See also Roger Zeter， The Role of Legal 
and Normative Frameworks for the Protection of Environmentally D叩 lacedPeople， in MI-
GRATION， ENVT & CLIMATE CHANGE: ASSESSING EVIDENCE 392 (Frank Laczko & Christine 
Aghazam eds.， 2009). Zeter identifies how protection norms have been extended to another 
specific category of migrant exemplified in the Dana Declaration on Mobile Peoples and Con-
servation leading to UN G巴neralAssembly Resolution in 2007， which protects rights of indig-
enous and mobile peoples to be protected from involuntary or forced displacement and 
addresses its impact on livelihods and cultural identity. Id. at 392. See also Mohammad 
Qawabah et al.， Dana Declaration on Mobile Peoples and Conservation (2002)， htp:/ 
danadeclaration.org/main_declarationenglish.shtml [https://perma.cc/9WB4・G7Y5]. Zeter 
also notes that“normative rights are embedded in the DIDR (Development-induced Displace-
ment and Resettlement) and the IRR (Impoverishment Risks and Rωov巴ry)-modelspio-
neered by the World Bank over the last two decades." Zeter， supra， at 392. 
151 See MAXINE BUR阻廿， ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK & DA VID FLORES， CTR. FOR PROGRES-
SIVE REFORM， REACHING HIGHER GROUND: AVENUES TO SECURE AND MANAGE NEW LAND 
FOR COMMUNITaS DISPLACED BY CUMATE CHANGE 1 (2017)， available at htp:/progresiver・
eform.org/articleslReachingHigherGround_1703.pdf [https://perma.ccIYB6J聞PQXW].
152 Davor Vidas， David Freestone & Jane McAdam， International Law and Sea Level Rise:・
The New lLA Committee， 21ILSA J. INTL & COMP. L. 397， 401 (2015). 
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at al.153 In short， though a social il is widely recognized， the very existence 
of multiple potential managers prevents any one player from taking respon-
sibility. This is especial1y true when the causes and harms of that il cross 
jurisdictional or state boundaries. Because of its crosscutting nature， climate-
induced rnigration can continue to evade focused attention because no one 
policy community is obliged to respond nor can rnigrants hold any one entity 
accountable for its failure to respond. Further， the conventions that appear 
most pertinent in theory are not in fact. For example， the Refugee Conven-
tion does not apply per the terms and interpretations of its “refugee" defini-
tion， despite its intuitively close association with cross-border climate 
rnigration.154 That climate rnigration is a squ紅'epeg for many legal holes 
indicates the legal and regulatory shape-shifting that climate change rnight 
force. 
Climate change， its justice implications， and its legal context are com-
plex and crosscutting. At this point， it is difficult to identify legal fields that 
climate rnigration does not affect. The reason is arguably obvious. All legal 
fields were developed during a period of relative stability vis主-viscli-
mate.155 All laws and underlying principles are mutable and capable of 
evolution， atleast in theory， but the climate back drop in which血eydevel-
oped was thought to be bound by immutable laws of nature. Accordingly， 
critiques of other areas of law relevant to climate rnigration are illurninating 
and necessary for assessing the ability of the law to withstand unceasing 
changes. In this regard， critiques of rnigration law， for example， are impor-
tant to consider. In a recent and trenchant assessment of intemational rnigra-
tion law， Professor Jaya Ramji-Nogales suggests that this field of law is 
itself a chief contributor-if not the progenitor-of many contemporary rni-
gration and refugee crises.156 Taking intemational refugee law as one exam-
ple， Ramji-Nogales notes that it benefits only a select group of rnigrants who 
fit into its narrow definition. It also encourages risk-taking activity to e吋oy
its prornised protections， often resulting in exacerbated crises. Intemational 
rnigration law is dorninated by the principle of non同foulement，which dis-
courages the practice of returning asylum seekers to a country in which ex-
isting leaders are liable to persecute those individuals.157 In order 
153 William W. Buzb民 TheRegulatory Fragmentation Continuum， Westway and the 
Challenges 01 Regional Growth， 21 J. L. & POL. 323， 356 (2005). 
154 See supra text accompanying notes 107-14. 
15 See discussion supra Introduction. See also Craig， s叩 ranote 22， at17. 
156 Jaya Ramji-Nogales， Migration Emergencies， 68 HASTINGS L. J. 609， 609 (2017). 
157Id. at 614. 
158Id. 
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migrants to show up at the borders of Australia， Europe， and the United 
States."159 Given the inherent uncertainty， disorder， and ad hoc nature of this 
kind of process， Ramji・Nogalesasks whether migration emergencies-or 
“crises" -are surprising events or “the logical and foreseeable outcomes of 
the structural failures of the global migration system."160 
There are at least two immediate concerns raised here， both relevant to 
climate migration. First， an arguably systemic flaw produces migration 
events， which decisionmakers label “crises." The term “crisis" is inade-
quate and inaccurate as it connotes a tempor紅 yor isolated incident. Second， 
the crisis lens also “obscures the complex and long term structural causes of 
international migration，" namely poverty and underdevelopment， food inse-
curity， and natural disasters.161 Migration “crises" related to climate change 
will likewise be neither temporary nor simple. 
Given由atestablishedinternational migration law suffers from argua-
bly fatal flaws， lawmaking relevant to climate related population movements 
would be especially important to conduct carefully. Cognizant of potential 
path dependence， lawmakers contemplating change will need to consider if a 
new framework's own internal logic unwittingly guarantees disorder. Fur-
ther， climate change itself presents unique and unprecedented coordination 
challenges. Ramji-Nogales wistfully writes:“One can imagine a legal re-
gime that anticipated migration flows and enabled safe and lawful move-
ment for migrants of al types."162 Indeed， the global community could make 
such a regime p訂 tof its belated response to climate displacement and clト
mate-related cross-border migration.163 First and foremost， however， Ramji-
Nogales recommends an open discussion that“views the [current] law as 
simply one possible (and rather inadequate) method of addressing migrant 
flows rather th組 acceptingcurrent legal frameworks as foundational and 
compulsory .叩Thesecalls to jettison 悶 stingassumptions about the law 
159Id. 
1印 Seeid. at 609. Further， Ramji-Nogales persuasively contends，“Intemational law has 
constructed a deeply path-dependent approach to intemational migration that not only obscures 
systemic inequality but also consumes altemate conceptions of morality." Id. 
161 Id. at 624. Ramji-Nogales also notes肱 influenceof cycles and structures of violenc巴
and， significantly， global pow巴rrelations. Id. 
162Id. at 614. 
163 See id. at 618 (arguing that “[h]ad more resources been devoted to anticipating and 
processing migration flows， [出eEU， US， and Australia] might have created institutions capa-
ble of managing those flows without becoming overwh巴lmed.In other words， this is arguably 
a crisis created by infrastructure choices， not a crisis of absolut巴capacity.").It is important to 
not巴thatduring the most recent migration crisis， migrant flows constituted 0.2% of each of the 
populations of the E.U. and Australia， and 0.02% of白巴 populationof the U.S. Id. at 618. 
Given出巴 relativesize of cross-border migrant flows， beter infrastructure choices can 
streng出encapacity. And， to出eextent that climate introduces even greater numbers， which is 
plausible， planning or expanding capacity and the ability to manage a dynamic and increasing 
phenomenon is optimal. Finally， and perhaps most important， this kind of proactive planning is 
best abl巴 toincorporate the perspectives of白巴 migrantsthemselves and ensure that states 
protect migrants' rights throughout the process of migration. 
164 Id. at 647-48. 
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are even more germane to the climate context， where they may help us avoid 
further entrenching the very assumptions that have brought the global com-
munity to the current climate precipice. From a climate justice perspective， 
avoiding repetition of the legal processes and assumptions that propel them 
is a key element of success. 
II. STATE SHIFT AND THE LIMITS OF ENVIRON阻 NTALLAW 
There is no analogue for the current state of nature. The enormity of the 
task to respond is difficult to appreciate even among those who intimately 
engage with climate science and climate law on a consistent basis. To date， 
domestic and intemational environmental law have been the prim紅 ylegal 
domains for addressing such comprehensive change. Despite the global con-
sequences， other areas of law are treated as irrelevant. Some practitioners 
actively understand themselves in opposition.165 
The effect of this posturing is that domestic environmental law， con-
structed with the lirnited capacity to save the trees-and generally failing to 
ensure equitable outcomes-is now freighted with saving the forest. 166 Gon-
zalez sirnilarly diagnoses intemational environmental law as a “field in cri-
sis，" as it currently confronts problems like climate change that are deeply 
165 See， e.g.， Luca Enriques et al.， The Basic Governance Structure:・品finoriりIShareholders 
and Non-Share加 lderConstituencies， inTHE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE 
AND FUNCTIONAL ApPROACH 93 (Oxford U. Press， 3d ed. 2017) (stating that恥 properchannel 
to addr巴scorporate impacts on environmental degradation is environmentallaw， not co中orate
law， and血at“白巴 useof legal rules and standards . . . topromote interests ex回 neousto the 
corporate form is， almost by d巴finition，not co中oratelaw， but the application to corpora-
tions-as legal persons-of norms from 0血erfields of law"); David M. Ong， The Impact 01 
Environmental Law on Corporate Governance: International and Comparative Perspectives， 
12 EUROPEAN J. lNTL L. 685， 698 (2001) (quoting Nazli Choucri， Multinational Corporations 
and the Global Environment， inGLOBAL ACCORD: ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES AND lNTER-
NATIONAL RESPONSES 205， 247 (Nazli Choucri ed.， 2003)) (“[G]lobal corporations， with few 
exceptions， have generally failed to develop a strategy for dealing with由巳巴nvironm巴nt.");id. 
at 701-02 (“The lack of an adequate intemational corporate environmental liability regime 
represents a m司orconstraint in the ability of intemational environmental law to impos巴 an
environmental protection objective or goal on出ecorporate govemance agenda."). 
166 For further exploration of出isquite useful analogy， see Bosselman， supra note 85， at
2424. Bossleman釘gues，
In essence， environmental law is hampered by a reductionist approach to its sub-
ject， i.e.，出eenvironment or more precisely， the human-nature relationship.百lis
relationship is misconceived because of the domination of certain philosophical and 
cultural traditions in European history. As a consequence， modem legislation to pro・
tect the natural environment has developed in a comp紅tmentalized，fragmented， 
economistic， and anthropocentric manner. 
Id. at 2425. 
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embedded in the existing econornic order.167 Consequently，“tinkering on the 
margins川 68will not suffice. 
A. Regime Sh{声sand Climate Change 
We are on the precipice of a regime shift， assurning it is not already 
underway. A regime shift， also known as a state shift or critica1 transition， is
a large， abrupt， persistent change in the structure and function of a system 
occurring when a critical threshold is crossed.169 Researchers have docu-
mented these shifts in a wide and diverse range of systems including finan-
cial markets， social networks， and ecosystems.170 Not al changes in structure 
or function are regime shifts. The change must affect the feedback structures 
of the system， which allow it to maintain its “emergent structure and func-
tion."171 A regime shift is， in effect，“a change that affects the identity of the 
system."172 Once a system is close to a threshold， even a small shock to出e
system can precipitate a shift in regimes. Most shifts， strikingly， are a “com-
plete su甲山e"to the people living in or managing the ecosystem.173 Nota-
bly-and distressingly-once a system shift has occurred， return to the 
previous regime is appreciably more difficult.174 Climate change has the po-
tential to trigger multiple ecosystem shifts， ifit has not already.175 
Unfortunately for the climate system on which we entirely rely， average 
globa1 temperature is set to increase by at least 30 Celsius by the end of the 
century.176 Without major ernissions reduction， the increase in annual aver-
age global temperatures could reach 50 Celsius above preindustrial times by 
2081.177 According to the most recent peer ieviewed research， internationa1 
policymakers are relying on IPCC projections that underestimate how much 
167 Gonzalez， supra note 3， at234. Gonzalez notes that: 
Climate change and other ecological disasters wil intensi今th巴suf，巴ringof th巴mil-
lions of P巴oplein白巴 globalSouth who lack adequate aces to environm巴ntalne-
cesities， such as ciean water， food and modern energy. However， this environ-
mental injustice remains largely outsid巴由epurview of international environmental 
law. Instead， food， water and energy are regulated through a patchwork of legal 
instruments and private紅 rangements，many of which fal in血巴 economiclaw field. 
Id. at 234. 
168Id. at 229. 
169 JUAN CARLOS ROCHA， RE町ETIEBIGOS & GARRY D. PETERSON， REOIME SHIFTS 
DATABASE， REGIME SHIFTS: WHAT ARE THEY AND WHY Do 1IiEY MATTER? 1 (2014). 
170Id. 
171 Id. at 2. 
172 Id. 
1731d. at 3. 
174 See id. at 4. 
175 See Kopp et al.， supra note 28， at412-13. 
176 CLlMATE ACTION ThACKER， http://climateactiontracker.org/[https://perma.cc/CS4N・
84CG]. 
177 D.R. Easterling et al.， Our Globally Changing Climate，的 CLIMATESCIENCE SPECIAL 
REPORT: FOURTH NATI. CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 35， 35， 42 (D.J. Wuebbles et al. eds.， 2017). 
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the planet will warm.178 Based on review of the most accurate climate mod-
els， Patrick T. Brown and Ken Caldeira find that there is a 93 percent chance 
that the planet will warm by more than 40 by the end of the century， whereas 
previous studies put those odds at an also discomfiting 62 percent.179 Either 
way， far steeper greenhouse gas ernissions reductions than previously calcu-
lated are required to avoid worst-case scenarios. Bleaker stil， even with 
graver changes set to come it is possible that global ernissions have already 
住iggereda cascade of regime shifts in essential systems. 
Moreover， continued global change will synchronously increase the 
risk， frequency， and intensity of multiple regime shifts across marine and 
terrestrial ecosystems.180 Many regime shifts， such as climate change， can 
amplify the drivers of other regime shifts.181 A study conducted by global 
sustainability researchers Reinette Biggs， Juan Carlos Rocha and Garry D. 
Peterson found that climate related drivers were shared across al currently 
observed regime shifts， increasing the expected risk of cascading shifts.182 
Further，“[m]ost drivers of global change are increasing along with expo-
nential growth in the global economy."183 A1though over one-third of the 
regime shift drivers the researchers identified， including climate change and 
greenhouse gas ernissions (deleterious to marine life， among other things)， 
require intemational cooperation to manage， local and national decision-
making can manage 62 percent of those創 vers，including fishing and agri-
culture.184 Unless rates of global change slow or reverse， however， these 
changes will overwhelm local management efforts on resilience， further un-
derscoring the importance of a rapid shift in legal regimes.185 
178 See Patrick T. Brown & Ken Caldeira， Greater Future Global Warming Inferredfrom 
Earth's Recent Energy Budget， 552 NA叩阻45，45 (2017). See generally Georgina Gustin， The 
Most Accurate Climate Models Predict Greater Warming， Study Shows， INSIDE CLIMA百 NEWS
(Dec. 6， 2017)， https://insideclimatenews.org/news/06122017 /climate-change-warming-fore-
cast-worst-case-best-models-ipcc-study [htps:/lperma.ccINJ8G-FXR5]. 
179 Brown & Caldeira， supra note 178， at47. 
180 Reinette Biggs， Juan Carlos Rocha & GarηD. Peterson， Regime Shifts in the Anthro-
pocene: Drivers， Risks， and Resilience， 10 PLOS ONE 1， 1 (2015) (“[恥1]anyregime shift 
dri vers are related to climat巴change加 dfood production， whose links to the continued expan-
sion of human activities makes them dificult to limit."). 
Id. 
18 See id. at 8. Biggs， Rocha， and Peterson explain that: 
Cascading effects occur wh巴ni) two regime shifts share the same causes increasing 
their corr巴lationin space or time， i)wh巴nthe occurrence of one regime shifts im-
pact the drivers of another increasing the likelihood of a domino efect， and ii) when 
two regime shifts potentially activate broader feedbacks that interconnect th巴irdy-
namics， a dynamic also known as cross-scale interactions. 
182Id. 
183Id. at 2. 
184 Id. at 8. 
185Id. at 10. See also John Bender， For Puerto Ricans Displaced by Maria， a First Christ-
mas Away from Home， NPR (Dec. 24， 2017， 8:15 AM)， htps・/lwww.npr.org/2017/12/24/
573166260/for-puerto-ricans-displaced-by -maria-aーfirst-christmas-away-from-home;In Flor-
ida， Puerto Ricans Displaced by Hurricane Maria Struggle to Adjust， CBS NEWS， (Dec. 5， 
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This article's appeal for rapid， parallel shifts in our legal regime is not 
made nonchalant1y. The rule of law endures because it ensures predictability 
and resists“hasty change."186 It is likely that some will view白iskind of 
revolutionary talk as anathema.187 The rule oflaw' s commitment to the status 
quo， however， isexactly what makes the law as currently constructed a dan-
gerous mismatch for advancing climate change and cascading concomitant 
effects. Regime shifts affect the “ecosystem services that society relies 
upon" and are therefore relevant to policy precisely because they are diffi・-
cult to anticipate and “often hard or even impossible to reverse."188 Steeped 
in research on critical transitions， Briggs， Rocha and Peterson acknowledge 
the “non-trivial challenge for governance" their research presents. Yet出ey
stil maintain that“[e]ven heroic actions， such as halting climate change or 
halting agricultural expansion， ifnot combined with 0出eractions， will be 
insufficient to avoid most regime shifts."189 At this moment in time， heroism 
and predictability are fundamentally incompatible. And， to be clear， generat-
ing better law to operate within and to the benefit of the current legal infra-
structure will not suffice. 
B. The Limits of Environmental Law 
The underlying complexity， interconnectedness， and inherent uncer-
tainty of climate change， of 21st Cen回rymigrations，190 and of climate-in-
duced migration altogether19 further challenge a legal system that tends to 
separate， differentiate， and ossify.192 Legal thought is attracted to conceptual 
structuring，193 which produces the taxonomies， linear views of causation， and 
2017， 7:48 AM)， https://www.cbsnews.comJn巴ws/puerto-ricans-relocate-toイlorida-face-difi-
cult -transitionl. 
186 See， e.g.， Humphreys， supra note 21， at146 (“The rule of law. . . is-and is intended to 
be-a bulwark against hasty change， a guarantor of the status quo， an inherentiy conservative 
principle: it is opposition to revolution and resistance to evolution."). 
187 Though alacrity is in part necessary because of the slow pace of response to systemic 
inequality and environmental degradation. 
18 ROCHA ET AL.， supra note 16920， at1. Rocha et al. also explain that“[i]n order to 
restore the system to a previous regime (or transform the system to an entirely new regime) 
on巴hasto manage key drivers (usualy slow variables)， often needing to bring them to a point 
wel below the critical tiping point at which the regime shift originaly occurred." ld. at 6 
(citation removed). 
1891d. at 8. 
190 In adition to the number of fields of law白atmight be at play in a migration scenario， 
scenarios of migration themselves紅 edeeply varied. KALIN & SCHREPFER， supra note 11， at20 
(noting出atlike migration， generaly， migration as adaptation to climate chang巴 canbe long-
or short-t巴rm，seasonal or permanent， intemal or cross-border and may include one family 
member or whole families). 
191 See generally Morini色re& Hamza， supra note 103 (noting the complexity of the isue 
as wel1 as the state of the global discourse on environmental1y-induced migration and how that 
complexity impedes forward movement on both research and policy fronts) 
192 See discussion of Grear and other climate justice scholars， supra Part 1. 
193 See discussion supra P紅t1. See also Grear， supra note 26; Humphreys， supra note 21; 
Bosselman， supra note 85 
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territorial jurisdictional parameters that Grear critiques.山 Thelaw reflects 
that preference for clear domains while tending to retard effective responses 
to systemic challenges， like st四 cturalracism or environmental change. Envi-
ronmentallaw exemplifies this ill-fitting tendency to manage complex natu-
ral systems with fixed and isolated law and policy. Klaus Bosselman 
describes this as the compartmentalization and fragmentation of the law.195 
Compartmentalization， according to Bosselman refers to the conceptual iso-
lation of the environment from other policy areas.196 Intemational environ-
mental law， for example， manages the global environment while the more 
impactful and degrading laws and principles of intemational economic law 
have avoided sufficient amendment.197 That compartmentalization has real-
world impact by rendering environmental law and policy irrelevant to， for 
example， commercial law or broader and more consequential public pol-
icy.198 Fragmentation describes a focus on specific aspects of the environ-
ment“ra出erthan its value as an integrated whole."199 In other words， 
policymakers literally lose the forest for the trees.2O 
Fragmentation and compartmentalization also impede rights claims.201 
First， few intemational human rights agreements explicit1y recognize a close 
link between human rights and the environment and even fewer recognize a 
right to a healthy environment.202 However， climate change is a threat with 
194 See Grear， supra note 26， at105. 
195 Bosselman， supra note 85， at 2431-33. Climate migration implicates multiple legal 
白eldsat multiple scales， including intemationallaws (development， human rights and humanト
tari岨， refugee)， domestic laws (property， immigration， national security， environmental)， and 
hybrid laws (migration and asylum， indigenous rights， climate law). 
1961d. at 2431-32 
197 See， e.g.， Alam & Razzaque， supra note 66， at623. 
198 See， e.g.， Boss巴Iman，supra not巴85，at 2425 (describing the way由atgovernments仕巴at
白eenvironment and stating，“[t]here are Ministries for the Environm巴nt，but it is th巴 Treasur-
ies that determin巴 publicpolicy. Ther巴 areenvironmental laws， but they are isolated from 
commerciallaws. And there are Law Schools with巴nvironmenta11awprogrammes， yet 80% of 
th巴 curriculumhas no environrnenta1 component at al."). 
199 ld. at 2432. See also Alejandro E. Camacho， Adapting GovemanceωClimate Change: 
Managing Uncertainか Througha Leaming lrifrastructure， 59 EMORY L. J.， 2009， at 26・27
(citing William Buzb旬、cataloguingof regulatory fragmentation that pervades govemmental 
resource management using taxonomic classifications such as vertical， horizontal， institutional， 
and tempora1); Buzbee， supra not巴 157，at 356. 
2∞Boss巴lman，supra note 2431. A further example of this are efforts to remediate n巴訂
shore marine health without considering upland land use policy. See e.g.， Maxine Burkett， 
lndigenous Environmental Knowledge and Climate Change Adaptation， inCLIMA百 CHANGE，
rnDIGENOUS f'EOPLES: THE SEARCH FOR LEGAL REMEDIES 96， 115-117 (Randall S. Abate & 
Elizabeth Ann Kronk eds.， 2013) (discussing the effect of Hawaii's historical management of 
water resources and climate chang巴 adaptation).
201 In the context of出eenvironment and environmentallaw， Bosselman defines comp訂 t-
mentalization as the“boxing-off' of the environrnent仕omother policy areas. Fragmentation 
refers to a focus on a specific aspect of由eenvironrnent rather出anits value as an integrated 
whole. Bosselman， supra note 85， at2432. 
202 Christina Voigt & Evadne Grant， Ediωrial， The Legitimacy of Human Rights Courts in 
Environmental Disputes， 6 J.HUM. RTS. & ENV'r 131， 133 (2015). Only two regional human 
rights treaties articulate environmental rights一白巴 AfricanCharter of Human and Peoples' 
Rights and th巴 Additiona1Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights. ld. at 133. 
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impacts that may resu1t in or amplify specific violations of human rights， 
including the rights to life， hea1th， and property.203 As Aled Dilwyn Fisher 
and Maria Lundberg explain， the traditional rights paradigm constructs a 
“rigid link" between rights-holders and states as duty-bearers， which con-
trasts with the very“complex" and “transnational geographies" that charac-
terize ecological crises like climate change.204 This more narrow focus also 
affects procedural elements of human rights law， impacting standing and 
access to human rights courtS.205 Further， the very strategies to achieve relief 
or redress employed privilege “‘actor-oriented' judicial strategies" focused 
on individuals as opposed to more “socio-political‘structure-orientated' ap-
proaches."206 The laiter is critically important to historically disadvantaged 
communities， because actor-oriented approaches can obscure the relation-
ship between one's relative responsiblity and capability with the institutional 
structures that have initiated and sustained those positions.207 
The novel questions climate migration introduces will not ease the deep 
analytical work left for existing legal frameworks.208 In addition to rights， for 
example， how do existing frameworks satisfactorily resolve the question of 
the international community's responsibility to avoid marginalization and 
disenfranchisement of individuals and communities on the move? How will 
governments assist displaced communities in their desire to stay in place， 
even if that preferred decision reaps further and far-reaching environmental 
degradation? What if borders and the conventional Westphalian construction 
of the nation-state are deemed too significant a hurdle for effective problem-
The artic1e-and entire speciaI edition of the joumaI→onsiders加 eappropriateness of trans-
forming environmentaI protection isues and出eintrinsic valu巴 ofnatur巴 intohuman rights 
questions." ld. at 134. See also Symposium， The Legitimacy of Human Rights Courts in Envi-
ronmental Disputes， 6 J.HUM. RTS. & ENVT 131 (2015). 
却 3CHRIS WOLD， DAVID HUNfER & MELISSA POWERS， CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW 
426 (1st ed. 209). See generally乱1axineBurkett， Legal Rights and Remedies， inTHE LAW OF 
ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS 185 (MichaeI Gerrard 
&K紅 tinaKuh eds.， 2012). 
加A1edDilwyn Fisher & Maria Lundberg， Human Rights' Legitimacy in the Face ofthe 
Global Ecologial Crisis-Indigenous Peoples， Ecological Rights Claims & the lnter-American 
Human Rights System， 8 J.HUM. RTS. & ENVT. 177， 180， n.8. See generally Burkett， supra 
note 52. 
205 Voigt & Grant， supra note 201， at134-35， n.12 (noting the European Court of Human 
Rights' definition of rights-holders as being only those“‘afected' by an activity detrimental to 
the environment"). The retroactive approach to environmental harm and the scope of remedy 
in human rights courts is aIso suboptimal. 
206 Fisher & Lundberg， supra note 204， at180， n.8. Fisher and Lundberg further argue that 
白e"continued normative legitimacy of human rights hinges on reconceiving rights as toIs for 
contesting unjust structuraI arrangements driving socio-ecologicaI crises." ld. at 185. On巴can
convincingly apply由民 recommendationto白ecur巴ntlaw and policy-making relevant to c1i-
mat巴ーinducedmigration. 
207 See， e.g.， Burkett， supra note 52. See also Burkett， Reconciliation and Non-Repetition， 
supra note 58. 
208 For a few of these questions in白巴 contextof“disappearing states，" se Skillington， 
supra note 130 
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solving and are rendered outmoded as a result?209 How would we answer出at
question? Is it heresy to even ask it? 
In any event， itseems fair to say that environmental law， bound and 
atornized in the compartmentalized construction of the law， cannot do the 
work alone.21O Indeed， even institutional players like Connie Hedegaard， the 
former European Comrnissioner for Climate Action in the European Com-
rnission， has stated that“climate change can no longer be understood as a 
purely‘environmental issue' because the econornic and social effects of出e
problem wi1l define the future."21l Indeed， the certainty of climate change 
and disruption may be the most we actual1y know about the future. 
IV. T田 NON-HYPOTHETICALSTATE OF NATURE 
In light of what we do not know about how climate change wi1 disrupt 
existing socio・politicalsystems and what we cannot know about the nature 
and content of so-cal1ed “climate surprises，" I contend that we are behind an 
actual veil of ignorance. Further， ifwe are tipping into a new state or regime， 
as studies cited above suggest， acknowledging由atwe are behind a veil 
would aid in efforts to identify more appropriate principles to guide our ju-
risprudence. Although， this article cannot and does not seek to erect a com-
plete theory of justice， it does engage heretofore neglected or discarded 
principles出athave a longer and richer history than the cultural norms that 
undergird our current legal system.212 These are principles血at，if resurrected 
after a process of reflection， would cease to silo the environment and fair 
ld. 
209 See， e.g.， id. at 11. Skillington explains， 
[T]he challenge is to accommodate the changing character of the sovereign state 
landscape by granting legal recognition to altemative forms of statehood. There are a 
number of issues at present preventing a broad support for any changes in this direc-
tion. P巴rhapsth巴 mostobvious is白eover-assertion of a traditional territory-nation 
state nexus where stat巴 identityis stil heavily bound up with the historical associa-
tions that have developed between particular land holdings and peoples. Because of 
historical ties， resource rights are thought to b巴 owedmore to fi巴llowco-nationals 
出anto humanity as a whole and stat巴 bord巴rsoffer clear distinctions between what 
are commonly s巴巴nas“politicaly relevant" resource inequalities (those occurring 
within the boundaries of a specific teritorial stat巴)and“politicaly irrelevant" ine-
qualities (for instance， those occurring between states in terms of the dis甘ibutionof 
th巴burdensof climate chang巴).
2¥0 Indeed， no single area of law is equipped to complete the task. As Humphreys states， 
“The law -human rights law， trad巴 law-is not ready-made to deliver climate justice: it must 
evolve. A question that arises is whether it can." Humphreys， supra note 21， at141. Hum-
phreys goes farther， finding that law “is not merely inadequate， but -in a complex sense -
counterproductive because of its ideological and historical formation." Grear & Gearty， supra 
note 84， at1ー7.
21 Grear & Gearty， supra note 84， at2. This includes future economic growth in the 
twenty-first century. 
212 See discussion infra Section IV.C. 
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outcomes and instead understand them as indispensable factors in al facets 
of our jurisprudence moving forward. 
A. The Rawlsian Exercise 
Not without con住oversyand contestation， John Rawls' A TheoηI of Jus-
tice and the veil of ignorance that he employs remain relevant to theoretical 
discourse more than forty years after initial publication. Conjuring a seem幽
ingly impossible hypothetical，213 the veil was nonetheless useful for its 
prornise to inaugurate more just systems-so useful that Rawls recognized 
that something like it must have occurred to many. In essence， toremove the 
effects of information that participants rnight use to their advantage (and 
therefore adulterate a more pure and authentic conception of justice) Rawls 
assumes that those engaged in the dialogue on justice (“the parties" or dia-
logue participants) are situated behind a veil of ignorance.214 He explains， 
“官leydo not know how the various alternatives will affect their own partic-
ular case and they are obliged to evaluate principles solely on the basis of 
general considerations."215 All p紅 tiesare in the original position and are 
deemed equal as moral persons. In that position no one knows his or her 
place in society， specific assets， abilities， intelligence or strength. Further， 
class position， social status， and presumably race， gender， and ethnicity are 
also unknown. And，“more than this，" according to Rawls，“the parties do 
not know the p紅 ticularcircumstances of their own society."216 In the origi-
nal position， each person has no information about the generation to which 
they belong. It may look like the present， or 2050 or (worse stil from a 
climate perspective) after 2100.217 The parties must choose principles， and 
the consequences of those principles， that each is prepared to live with ire-
spective of the generation they occupy.218 The only fact known is that the 
society is subject to the circumstances of justice conceived and “whatever 
this implies."219 
213 RAWLS， 1971 ed.， supra note 30， at12 (“This original position is not， of course， 
thought of as an actual historical state of afairs， much les as a primitive condition of culture. 
It is understood as a purely hypothetical situation characterized so as to lead to a certain 
conception of justice."). See JOHN RAWLS， A THEORY OF JUSTICE 104 (Oxford U. Pres， rev 
ed. 1999) (hereinafter RAWLS， 1999 ed.) (“So while th巴conc巴ptionof出巴 originalposition is 
P釘 tof the theory of conduct， it do巴snot follow at al that白ereare actual situations that 
resemble it. What is necessary is由atthe principles出atwould be accepted play the requisite 
part in our moral reasoning and conduct."). 
214 RAWLS， 1999 ed.， supra note 213， at118. 
215Id. 
2161d. 
217 See generally CLIMA司 SCIENCESPECIAL REpORT: FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE As 
SESSMENT 1， supra note 5， at4. 
2180n consequences， Rawls states，“Al ethical doctrines worth our atention take cons巴-
quences into account in judging rightnes. One which did not would simply be irational， 
crazy." RAWLS， 1999 ed.， supra note 213， at26. 
219Id. at 119. 
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The original position behind the veil is peculiarly relevant to the current 
climate crisis. The original position is a thought experiment that allows the 
parties to conceive of the basic principles of justice with each one knowing 
that， once the veil is lifted， each could end up in the worst off position. 
Consequently， whatever principles of justice implied or entailed by the origi-
nal position would ensure， ideally， that the worst off would be in the best 
feasible position.220 In a contempor紅Ytwist (given the current state of na-
加re)the precise degree of harm， risk， or opportunity climate change will 
introduce， once the veil is lifted， isalso unknown. Are your Marshallese， the 
CEO of a multinational oil and gas company， or a traditional knowledge 
holder? Behind the climate veil， what would each one say is the most feasi-
ble position for the “worst off person" to occupy that would stil be consid-
ered just? 
In many respects， the current impasse in settling on and advancing truly 
effective climate policy is because， generally speaking， wealthy and higher 
ernitters are not acting to foreclose the gravest impacts that poorer， lower 
ernitters experience. This is true across time and space.221 Arguably， ifpar幽
ties are behind a veil with respect to their individual identities and， therefore， 
ignorant of their relative advantages while cognizant of the fact that they 
rnight emerge from behind the veil in the less favored position， then the 
dialogue participants will more likely advance just and assertive theories， 
principles， and structures that are unadulterated by their positions of power 
and adequately responsive to changes in climate. 
B. Altemative Climate Futures and the New Veil 
Relevant to present pu中oses，Rawls takes for granted出atthose behind 
the veil “know the general facts about human society.'切 2Those facts， for 
Rawls， include an understanding of political affairs and principles of eco-
nornic theory as well as the basis of social organization and the laws of 
human psychology. At base， individuals are presumed to know whatever 
general facts affect the choice of justice principles. Accordingly， the physics 
of climate change， systems instability and cascading regime shifts， and the 
role and consequences of certain principles of econornic theory in relation to 
the current state of nature would also be known. This set of information is 
not barred. As Rawls affirms: 
tion札1，血a幻tiおs，on general laws and theories， since conceptions of justice must 
be adjusted to the characteristics of the systems of social cooperation which 
2201 thank Dr. Kyle Powys White for his invaluable insight on出eartic1e's rl巴deployment
of Rawls' theory and白巴 implicationsof the thought experiment on the original position in a 
c1imate-constrained world. 
221 See generally Stephen M. Gardiner， A Perfect Storm: Climate Change， Intergenera-
tional Ethics & the Problem of Moral Corruption， 15 ENVTL VALUES 397 (2006). 
出三 RAWLS，1999 ed.， supra note 213， at119. 
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they are to regulate， and there is no reason to rule out these facts."223 Of 
course， however， that is all dialogue participants can know in the climate 
change context， as the specifics are uncertain and contingent on concerted 
rnitigative and adaptive action-or lack thereof. 
The principles derived from this exercise would moderate all further 
agreements and specify the kinds of social cooperation in which individuals 
rnight engage and the forms of government established.24 Importantly， this 
article would not endorse-because principles of justice would not flow 
企om-cabinednotions of reason， rationality， and furthering of one's own 
interests.25 This is a sharp and definitive depぽturefrom Rawls and his phil-
osophical tradition. It is important to stress， in light of the preferred ap-
proaches discussed below，26 that this tradition has developed within a very 
specific subset of Western cultural expression and its applicability across 
cultures is the subject of longstanding debate.27 It is also important to note 
that， with respect to econornic rationality， environmentally destructive rea-
soning has shaped both the capitalist and socialist world and established the 
223Id. 
224Id. at 10. 
225 Id. (arguing that出巴 principlesof justice are the principles“that f党巴 andrational per-
sons concerned to白rther出eirown int巴restswould accept in an initial position of equality as 
defining the fundamental terms of their association."). For related and very well-developed 
critique， see SEN， supra note 31. For a powerful engagement of Sen's critiqu巴in出econtext of 
climate disaster law， see LYSTER， supra note 31， at100--03. This philosophical tradition is also 
a foundational assumption of Garrett Hardin's trag巴dyof the comrnons. Bosselman offers 
incisively: 
τhe most interesting aspect of Hardin's essay is the assumed inability of the individ-
ual actors to look beyond the here and now. They consider it rational to maximize 
individual gain and would not question such rationality even if presented with the 
information that th巴 accumulationof individua1 pursuits is disastrous for everyone. 
They are locked into a system of self-destruction. The qu巴stionis， of course， how 
rational it really is to maximiz巴 individualgain at the expense of others and 
everything. 
Bosselrnan， supra note 85， at2426. 
226 See discussion inj均 SectionIV.C. 
227 See Thomas Dietz & Rachael Shwom， Culture， Environmental Risk Perception and 
Behavior， POPULATION-ENy'T REs. NETWORK 2-3 (May 17， 2017)， https://www.population-
environmentresearch.org/pern__files/statements/PERN%20Cyb巴rseminar2017%20Dietz%20
and%20Shwom.pdf [https://peロna.cc/BZC5-LM3P](noting that the rational actor model was 
“developed to describe market interactions in Western capitalist societies. There is a v巴rylong-
standing debate about白edegree to which it applies cross-culturally"). For an assessment 
based on indigenous perspectives， see VAL NAPOLEON， NATL CTR. FIRST NATlONS GOYERN 
ANCE， THJNKING ABOUT lNDIGENOUS LEGAL ORDERS 6-7 (2007). Napoleon explains: 
Id. 
τ'h巴reis an important difference betw巴巴n，on the one hand， believing that the laws 
thems巴lvesare spiriωal and sacred， and outsid巴 humancontrol， and on the other 
hand， understanding that alllaw， including western law， isfound巴don a world view 
(i.e.， how we see human beings， non-human life forms， and the spirits and the uni-
verse). It is hard to perceive this in western law because it is always described as 
“normal" and “rational." But alllaw， including western law， isbased on佃 under-
standing of humans (i.e.， individua1， rational， competitive， etc.) and of the 
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philosophical grounds for， among other things， dualism， anthropocentrism， 
and materialism， and their deleterious effects in multiple spheres， from local 
livelihoods to global climate.228 
As mentioned， this article does not seek to forward a theo可 ofjustice 
as many climate justice colleagues call for in more or less detailed fashion.229 
Instead， it seeks to reveal and make clear the distinct， non-hypothetical veil 
and galvanize a process to build a new theory and identify the buttressing 
principles.230 Even though a counter-theory is not forthcorning here， the geo-
physics and geopolitics of climate change rnilitate in favor of employing 
core ethical notions that rnight be at play. Instead of unwavering faith in 
rationalism， it endorses notions of ecological integrity and ecological bottom 
lines， in furtherance of humanity' s shared interest and in light of the state of 
the world and the gravity of the shared prognosis. Decision-makers at al 
scales would act in furtherance of foundational maxim that humanity is one 
expression of nature defending itself， today， against the excesses and neces-
sary byproducts of the structural inequities described above. This process 
would not have a reparative function with respect to specific injuries already 
experienced; it is forward-looking by its own parameters. A parallel process 
for reparation is also in order but， as to particular remedies， isdistinct. A 
guarantee of“non-repetition"， that is a comrnitment to create structures or 
processes that foreclose the ability for a wrongdoer to repeat offending acts， 
could be woven into the fabric of a new theory， however.23¥ 
228 See Bosselman， supra note 85， at2430. 
229 General cals include， Grear， supra not巴26;Humphreys， supra note 21， at 134， 137-39 
(quoting WAL百 R BENJAMIN， Theses on the Philosophy of Histoη， in lLLUMJNATIONS 253， 
261-64 (1969)) (巴ngagmg恥 notionof jetztzeit-a time“伽tis ripe wi由民volutionaryposi-
bility， time that has been detached from白巴 continuumof history . . . time at a standstil， 
poised [and] filed with energy"-and noting白at“preciselybecause some of the destruction 
we are wreaking right now is‘ireversible'， w巴 arenot well equipped to imagine what form 
‘justice' might take in出atdistant time.百lebest we can do，出en，might be to build institutions 
capable of dealing justice."); Klaus Bosselman， A Vulnerable Environment:・ Contextualising
Law with Sustainabiliη， 2 J.HUM. RTS. & ENV'T 45， 45 (2011) (“百世sarticle makes the case 
for an ecological approach to law， one aiming for social transformation rather than environ-
mental mitigation."); Gonzalez， supra note 33， at239 (“Without a fundamental restructuring 
of intemational economic and environmentallaw， a just and sustainable planet in the Anthro-
pocene epoch is impossible.")τbough distinct in form and function， Rosemary Lyster makes 
a more detailed and related cal for a de1iberative process in Towards a Global Justice Vision 
for Climate Law in a Time of 'Unreason'， 4 J.HUM. RTS. & ENVT 34 (2013) (arguing出at
出ereis an urgent need for a process of impartial public reasoning and discussion on the isue 
of c1imate change to emerge， so as to limit白eimperatives of national interest and move 
towards a global justice approach). 
230 This is les controv巴rsialfor Sen if at all.τb巴“reflectiveequilibrium" that Rawls 
advances and grounds the白eoryof justice is紅 guablyclose to Sen's endorsement of public 
deliberation. See Stefan Bird-Pollan， Book Review， 2 PuB. REASON 105 (2010) (reviewing 
AMARTYA SEN， THE lDEA OF JUSTICE (H訂 v.U. Pres 2011)). 
231 See Burkett， Climate Reparations， supra not巴 58，at 511; Burkett， Reconciliation and 
Non-Repetition， supra note 58， at100. A commitrnent by the wrongdoer not to repeat白e
offending act， also known as the "guarantee of nonrepetition，" is indispensable for good faith 
rep泊r.Embracing climate-as-geopolitics wil more likely ensure “non-repetition" of由esys-
tems由atd巴liveredthis outcome by the very solutions crafted to respond to it today. 
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The aim for invoking a Rawlsian exercise is to work out a theory of 
justice that is relevant to contemporary social and ecological demands that 
endure well into a climate-defined future. To succeed， it would， at the very 
least， need to provide an affirmative and viable alternative to the current 
socio-econornic and legal structures.232 
C. Embracing Exited Rights Discourses:・AView 斤omthe Peripheη 
A theory however elegant and economical must be rejected 
or revised if it is untrue; likewise laws and institutions 
no matter how々がcientand well-αrranged must be 
reformed or abolished if they are unjust. 
- John Rawls233 
To produce a theory of justice ripe for the task at hand， certain dis-
courses白athave been relegated to the periphery as well as unresolved rights 
claims are especially relevant-and potentially transformative.234 These dis-
courses have long provided comprehensive critiques of the current socio-
econornic and legal order. They a1so ref1ect centuries-or even rnillennia-old 
principles that support frameworks of justice and engage the needs of the 
subaltern as well as the ecological systems to which a11 societies and their 
members are inextricably linked. This section briefly explores three of these 
discourses: indigenous epistemologies and legal orders， earth jurisprudence， 
and the discourse and hopeful contestation at the intersection of earth juris-
prudence and environmental justice. 
1. Indigenous Legal Orders 
With the need to adapt to climate change， local governments and agen-
cies have made efforts to explore and engage traditiona1 or indigenous envi-
ronmenta1 knowledge for resource management.235 This reengagement has 
primarily sought to extract specific management practices and detloy them 
in an ad hoc manner， without any meaningful engagement of indigenous 
worldviews. These worldviews deserve attention. 
232 This is important practically and dial巴cticaly.A coherent and compreh巴nsivetheory of 
justice and accompanying principles is necess町 tomeet悦 demandsof a changing c1imate. 
They are also needed as strong and meaningful retort to naysayers who c1aim白atc1imate 
justice conceptions of society are idealistic， u叩ersuasive，or impracticable. 
233 RA WLS， 1971 ed.， supra note 30， at3 
234 For one relevant explication of the relationship betwe叩 justiceand rights， see id. at 4 
(“A set of principles is required for choosing among the various social arrangements which 
deterrnine this division of advantages and for underwriting an agreement on the proper distrib-
utive sh紅白.These principles are白eprinciples of social justice: they provid巴 away of as-
signing rights and duties in the basic institutions of society and由eydefine the appropriate 
distribution of白巴 benefitsand burdens of social cooperation."). 
235 See Bur~巴tt， supra note 200 ， at97-98. See also Anthony Moffa， Traditional Ecologi-
cal Rulemaking， 35 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 101， 110 (2016). 
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Here， the term “indigenous" is used to describe the original or first 
peoples of any coun位y.236For some “knowledge" necessarily includes spiri-
tuality， relationships with the land and other farnily members， oral traditions， 
storytelling， and ceremony.237 Accordingly， the term “indigenous environ-
mental knowledge" is used to describe a system of knowledge， practice， and 
belief that describes the relationship of living beings and their environment. 
This system has evolved through tradition as well as adaptive processes 
over time and has passed from generation-to-generation by cultural 
transllUssion.238 
Indigenous knowledge， therefore， often contrasts with western or scien-
tific knowledge in at least three ways.239 Some indigenous peoples develop 
and cultivate environmental knowledge through hands-on experience.240 Fur-
ther， the knowledge is embedded in culture and is unique to specific loca-
tions. As a result， it is dynarnic and diverse within and between societies and 
generations.241 Finally， it is holistic. It is a way of life and a worldview.242 
Of course， because of its dynarnic nature， itis impossible-and un-
wise-to suggest that the term “indigenous environmental knowledge" can 
reliably describe al indigenous systems of knowledge， practice， and be-
lief. 243 For example， for Pacific Islanders there is no one “cosmology" that 
“defines the nature of the universe or atmosphere."244 Sirnilarly， Rebecca 
Tsosie explains that the diversity among Native American nations makes 
defining an“indigenous land ethic，" for example， difficult.245 Indigenous 
views on the environment are not necessarily uniform or in consensus， ac-
cording to Tsosie， and each nation has a “complex worldview with a unique 
understanding of the environment."246 Further， reinforcing the notion that 
236 Sandra Styres et al.， Walking in Two Worlds: Engaging the Space Between Indigenous 
Community and Academia， 3 CAN. J. OF Eouc. 617， 619 (2010). 
237 Justin Gi1igan et al.， The Value of Integrating Traditional， Local and Scientific Knowl-
edge， inCLIMATE CHANGE: LINK到 GTh.AomONAL AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEOGE 4 (Rick Riewe 
& Ji1 Oakes eds.; 2006). 
238 This definition is deri v巴dfrom definitions of traditional knowledge used by Gi1igan et 
al. and Fikret Berkes， Johan Colding & Carl Folke; Berkes et al.， Rediscovery of Traditional 
Ecological Knowledge as Adaptive Management， 10 E氾OLOGICALApPLICATIONS 1251， 1252 
(200). 
239 Bosire Maragia， The Indigenous Sustainability Paradox and the Quest for Sus-
tainabiliη的 Post-ColonialSocieties:・IsIndigenous Knowledge All that is Needed?， 18GEO. 
1Nr'L EN円L.L. REv. 197，202ー03(206). 
240Id. 
241Id. 
242Id. See also Berkes et. al， supra note 238， at1252. 
243 VAL NAPOLEON & HADLEY FRIEOLANO， INoIGENOUS LEGAL ThADITIONS: ROOTS TO 
RENAISSANCE 2， 226 (Markus D. Dubber & Tatjana Homle eds.， 2014) (“[IJt can be chaleng-
ing to talk broadly about lndigenous legal traditions without grosly over-simplifying them or 
resorting to sweeping pan-Indigenous generalities"). 
Z判 MelissaL. Finucane， Why Science Alone Won't Solve the Climate Crisis: Managing 
Climate Risks初 thePacific， ASIA PACIFIC IssUEs， Aug. 2009， at3. 
<4> Rebecca Tsosie， Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of Self-Determi，即 tion:The 
Role of Ethics， Economics， and Traditional Ecological Knowledge， 21 VT. L. REV. 225， 268 
(196). 
246 Id. at 246， n.l08. 
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Indians live in static harmony with nature in a manner that has been and will 
always be peaceful and serene， entrenches a ubiquitous stereotype that risks 
essentializing the American Indian identity and experience.247 Indeed， not al 
traditional systems of practice and belief were ecologically adaptive from 
their inception-they were adaptive by definition， changing over time with 
the existing conditions.248 
In spite of the above， there are “some essential similarities"249 among 
indigenous worldviews regarding the environment that are relevant and dis-
tinct from contemporary， predominantly Westem approaches.250 Regarding 
Pacific Islanders， itis helpful to recognize that for many there is a shared 
view出atthe natural and spiritual worlds are both important.251 Further， in-
teraction with their local environments has yielded deep environmental 
knowledge that， coupled with cultural beliefs， has formed models of how the 
natural world works-and how humans work best in accord.252 Ecosystem 
and watershed management practices in the Pacific Islands， for example， 
demonstrate the holistic approach that is common across Polynesian， Micro-
nesian， and Melanesian cultures.253 Again， most relevant to this discussion， 
the indigenous wisdom vis-a-vis the environment is at least similar in its 
fundamental difference from Westem understandings of the environment， 
which today tend toward reductionism.254 In light of the current state of na-
ture， indigenous scholars， like Val Napoleon and Hadley Friedland， remark 
that it is no wonder many hope白atindigenous legal traditions， as expres-
sions of worldview， have something positive to offer to the current discourse 
in contrast to白epredominant sociolegal structures.255 Those traditions， 
. though， have notsurvived the ongoing impacts of colonialism in a pristine 
247Id. at 227. 
剖 8Berkes et. a1， supra note 238， at1252 (explaining that exagg巴ratedclaims on b巴halfof 
traditiona1 ecologica1 wisdom need a “reality check"). See also Maragia， supra note 239， at
202， 219 (questioning由ebeli巴f白紙 mostindigenous societies were sustainable and sug-
gesting that indigenous knowledge could boost sustainable development if de-essentialized， 
among other白jngs).
249 Tsosie， supra note 245， at246 n.108. 
250Id. at 268. 
251 Finucane， supra note 244， at3. 
252Id. 
253百leHawaiian a1lUpua‘a，出etabinau of白eYap， the vanua of Fiji， and the puava of出e
Solomon Islands suggest a deep simHarity in mountain-to-sea land and water resource manage-
ment. Berkes et a1.， supra note 2， at1255 (explaining白atthe four terms refer to generica11y 
sirnilar watershed-based management systems). 
254 Berkes et. al， supra note 238， at1252. See also Tsosie， supr，αnote 245， at268 (explain-
ing白at“出esesirnilarities are useful for comp訂 ativediscussion of Euro-American land 
ethics"); Moffa， supra note 235， at110 (arguing “whe由eror not policymakers agree whole-
heartedly with [the assessment that indigenous knowledge of environmental planning far sur-
passes白escientific analysis of dorninant West巴msocieties]，出eymust at least acknowledge 
出at由巴 inherentcomplexity of ecosystems has proved a poor match for reductionist science 
白紙 takesthe form of controled experiments."). This mismatch， according to Moffa， evinces 
the potential utility of traditional ecological knowledge that，“with its holistic approach， rnight 
be able to ofer insights into complex， nonlinear systems." Id. (citation ornited). 
25 NAPOLEON & FRfEDLAND， supra note 243， at2. Napoleon and Friedland use “Indige-
nous lega1 traditions" to refer to Indigenous lega1 protocols and laws. 
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and undamaged state. A thoughtful engagement of core principles by dia-
logue participants， however， might provide a useful and viable counter-
weight to the current fragmented and compartmentalized legal infrastructure. 
2. Earth Jurisprudence and the Ecological Bottom Line 
Climate change is the resu1t of a very particular way of doing business. 
It is the massive externality of a chosen political economy.256 Whereas the 
resu1t was not intended， the tendency to isolate or elide the “environment" 
or“nature" and climate in our economic calculus has been predominant and 
deliberate.257 Earth Jurisprudence， which is a field of law that seeks to give 
greater consideration to nature in lawmaking， may be p訂 ticularlyinstruc-
tive. This a1ternative approach counsels in favor of aligning sociolegal s加 c-
tures with the ecological bottom line by identifying and adhering to 
measures that reflect a fundamental understanding of ecological limits. 
Some legal scholars have already offered up and forwarded legitimate 
and persuasive ecologically-based critiques and amendments that are worth 
consideration. Klaus Bosselman's work on the reductionist approach to na-
ture and the environment-and， by extension-environmentallaw， is revela-
tory for the uninitiated reader.258 In short， environmental reductionism 
describes “a compartmentalized， fragmented， and anthropocentric idea of 
the environment."259 The effect of the dominance of the environmental re・
ductionism is that“it nurtures a mindset of total human dominance over， and 
relative independence from， nature， in which ‘nature' becomes ‘the other' 
and is constructed as inferior， functioning as litle more than raw material for 
economic-technological progress."260 Fragmentation of the environment is 
pervasive in environmental law throughout the world， with a few notable 
exceptions.261 Bosselman concedes that this is defensible in that laws need to 
be specific and enforceable on a case-by-case basis. An overall lack of a 
foundationallaw that recognizes and affirms the environment as the founda-
tion of life and the integrity of ecological systems as non-negotiable， how-
ever， isdeeply consequential and arguably has brought us to the brink.262 
In order for a reflective and deliberative process to succeed from a cli-
mate justice perspective it would resist the compartmentalization of environ幽
mental， sociopolitical， and economic processes and policies. Indeed， as 
Bosselman asserts-and consistent with conceptions of Earth Jurispru-
dence-compartmentalization is a deeply rooted cause of the current crisis. 
256 See Burkett， supra note 52. 
257 See generally Bosselman， supra note 85; Boss巴lman，supra note 229， at48. 
258 See generally Bosselman， supra note 85. 
259 ld. at 2431. 
260 Bosselman， supra note 229， at48. 
261 See discussion supra Section II.B. 
262 Bosselman， supra note 85， at2438.“History， science and ethics，" Bosselman reIUnds， 
“al point to the same rather simple idea: any form of d巴velopmentmust respect ecological 
boundaries to avoid declin巴orcolapse." ld. 
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Earth Jurisprudence recognizes the “interconnectedness of Earth' s natural 
systems， the inherent rights and value of nature， and the dependence of hu-
manity on a11 living beings on a hea1thy Earth."263 Consistent with Earth 
Jurisprudence， Bosselman reminds白at“nature"is a cu1tural construct and 
that“Westem ontology， with its dichotomy between nature and culture， is
very different from the non-Westem perception of complementarities."264 
Yet that explication may not be sufficient because principles of complemen-
tarity， though admittedly subordinated， have organic roots in altemative iter-
ations ofWestem ontology.265 All of this is relevant to the current discussion 
because it suggests that theories at the periphery， oft-derided as idealistic 
and impracticable， have a rich and universal history worth resurrecting. 
Earth Jurisprudence might emerge仕omthe periphery as it fundamen-
tally presupposes that human societies' viability and u1timate ability to flour-
ish are possible if humans understand themselves as pぽ tof an 
interconnected network. It does not reduce nature to commodity for human 
use and does not support the privileging of the rights of corporations， for 
instance， over and above the rights that can secure ecologica1 integrity for al 
humans and non-humans. The notion that the trade regime is the 
predominate force in the intemationa11egal system while the climate regime， 
despite the existential relevance of the subject matter， issidelined and strug-
gling is inconsistent with this philosophy and， perhaps， common sense. That 
由e住aderegime can comfortably ignore the impacts of climate change is 
even more striking and underscores the profoundly deleterious effects of a 
fragmented and anthropocen住民 jurisprudence.Further， the pro引 ldless
growth paradigm is fundamenta11y incompatible with deeply rooted man-
dates to live within ecological limits. Employing an ecological bottom-line 
encourages diversity in human govemance， embracing cu1tura1 pluralism and 
indigenous knowledge， among other things. A theory of justice and underly-
ing principles would benefit greatly from this re-orientation. A rigorous ex-
ploration of the component govemance frameworks and institutions that 
could flourish would aid in delivering this philosophy of law and governance 
from detracting (and distracting) cries of utopian delusion.26 
Accessing and engaging this phil 
263 See CTR. FOR EARTH JURIS.， H甘 p・//WWW.EARTHJU則訂ORG[https://penna.ccrr84Y-
FBCU]; First National People of Color Environrnental Leadership Sumrnit， Principles 01 Envi-
ronmental Justice (1991) (hereinafter Principles 01 Environmental Justice]， https://www具jnet
.org/ej/principles.html [https://penna.cc/62DV-FME5]. 
264 Bosselman， supra note 229， at48. 
265Id 
2出 MaxineBurkett， Climate Disobedience， 27 Dma ENVTL L. & POL'y F. 1，6ー10(2016). 
267 Bosselman， supra note 85， at2437 (“τbe fact that出巴 industrialrevolution ignored出is
knowledge does not render it useles， obviously. It only meant that the idea of sustainability 
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lndeed， Western conceptions of holism are a part of European heritage.268 
Tbough subdued for centuries with grave effect-like its kindred philoso-
phies and legal systems in the Global South-it is now especially pertinent. 
3. EJ舟rEJ
The almost searnless compatibility of Earth Jurisprudence with environ-
mental justice269 (“EJ")， which is concerned with the interplay of race， pov-
erty， and environmental risk， is not difficult to argue. lndeed the fluid， 
integrative， and interconnected perception of the environment for Earth Ju-
risprudence is consistent with the environmental justice advocates' informal 
definition of one's environment; that is， the environment is where you live， 
work， and play.270 Further， EJ movements have included intergenerational 
justice and the rights of nature as part of their core principles.27I To bridge 
divides between the Global North and South and respond to global ecologi-
cal crisis， environmental and climate justice scholars， like Carmen Gonzalez， 
explore EJ in an international context as well. Gonzalez prescribes proce-
dures for international environmental law that are normatively grounded in 
respect for nature as well as for social， econornic， and environmental jus-
tice.272 Gonzalez also lifts up transnational EJ movements， which take as 
their task an integrated approach to justice that includes climate food， en-
ergy， water， among other things.273 Further， the p回 senceof rnigrant justice 
organizations， like No One is Ilegal， at recent climate marches274 suggest 
less仕agmentationand fu吋lerlinkages. across intimately connected justice 
S佐uggles.
D. A View介omthe Bottom 
Alternative philosophies and associated rights discourses are robust and 
well-developed. They are hopeful demonstrations of what rnight emerge 
from behind the veil. It is worth noting， too， that the legal ecosystem may 
already be at the tipping point of its own critical transition. As noted above 
did not fit the pervasive idea of progress. Essentially，出shas not changed until today--except 
for the fact that the case for sustainability has never b巴巴nstronger."). 
268 Bosselman， supra note 229， at58. 
269 See generally Burkett， supra not巴 59.百leenvironmental justice movement is con-
cerned with the interplay ofrace， poverty and environmental osk， generaly. Findings白紙poor
and of-color communities sufer from pollution more frequently and severely白antheir white 
counterparts spurr巴dthe developm巴ntof significant practical and theoretical responses. With 
the advent of perceptible climate change， a new framework of climate justice-mindful of the 
p副 icul釘 sof a warming Earth as well as出eponciples of environmental justice一has
emerged. See id. 
270 See id. 
271 See， e.g.， Princ伊lesof Environmental Justice， supra note 263. 
272 Gonzalez， supra not巴33，at 221. 
273 See id. 
274 See Saad， supra note 66， at101. 
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in Part II， regime shifts， ecological and otherwise， are often a complete 
surprise to the inhabitants. 
Recent advances in legislation and litigation do hint at a legal shift. 
Grants of personhood to waterways have occurred in disparate spaces. New 
Zealand granted legal personhood to the Whanganui River，275 with the poten-
tial effect of empowering marginalized communities and worldviews.276 
Sirnilarly， the High Court of the state of Uttarakhand， lndia， granted legal 
personhood to the sacred Rivers Ganga and Yamuna.277 With respect to the 
environment， generally， the Supreme Court of lndia recognized a constitu-
tional right to a healthy environment. 278 More recent1y， the High Court of 
Ireland recognized for the first time a personal constitutional right to an en-
vironment that supports dignity and well-being.279 The Court stated that: 
A right to an environment that is consistent with the human dig-
nity and well-being of citizens at large is an essential condition for 
the fulfilment of al human rights. It is組 indispensableexistential 
right that is enjoyed universally， yet which is vested personally as 
a right that presents and can be seen always to have presented， and 
enjoy protection， under . . . the Constitution.捌
These advances are in addition to over a hundred constitutions have 
been amended to incorporate environmental rights and duties to some de-
gree.281 Finally， and especially relevant to climate rnigration， current South 
Pacific negotiation processes introduce post-colonial responses to rnigration， 
namely questioning imposed border and nation-state demarcations，加dre-
vive pre-colonial notions of connectivity in Ocea凶a.282
Whether出 sis a shift that initiates a critical transition in the fundamen-
tal identity of the legal system is unclear at this point. lt is important to note 
白atin the United States， federal courts have consistent1y rejected the notion 
275 M紅 yPapenfuss， New Zealand Welcomes a Mighty River to Personhood， HUFF町 GTON
POST (March 17， 2017， 3:08 AM)， https://www.huffingtonpost.comJen佐y/new-zealand-river-
personhood_us_58cb6dI3e4b00705db4巴02e2[https:llperma.ccN7PT・EGHP].
276 Gre紅 ，supra not巴 26，at 129. 
277 Mohd. Sa1im v. State of Ut闘はhand，Writ Petition (PIL) No.126 of 2014， decided on 
20.03.2017， available at https:llwww.nonhumanri凶tsproject.orglcontentluploads/WPPIL-126-
14.pdf [https:llperma.ccI7E8V・FZCF].
278 Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar and Ors， (1991) 1 SC 420 (India)， available at http:// 
www.globalh ealthrights.org/wp -contentluploads/201311 0IKumar-India-1991.pdf [htps:lper 
ma.cc/9RX3-YV29]. 
279 Friends of the Irish Environment CLG v. Fingal County Council (H. Ctふavailableat 
htp://blo gs2.la w .columbia.edu/climate-change-litigationlwp-contentluploadslsites/16/non -us-
case・documents/2017/20171121_2017-No.344-JRjudgment.pdf [https:llperma.cc/A3FR・
CF9U]. 
280Id. at 292. 
281 Bosselman， supra note 229， at59. See also In re Application of Maui Elec位icCo.， 
Ltd.， No. SCWC-15-0000640 (Haw. Dec. 14，2017). 
282 See， e.g.， Klepp & Herb巴ck，supra note 132， at71-72. 
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that there is a constitutional right to a clean environment.283 The Court did， 
however， recent1y recognize a previously unrecognized “fundamental right" 
in Obe1志向作Iv. Hodges， suggesting that the limits of relatively fixed sets of 
constitutional rights might be more fluid than previously conceived.284 With 
emerging and novel cases in the United States，285 Michael Burger asks， 
“Have we come far enough on climate change to activate the legal imagina-
tion of the panel' s judges? Do they agree with . . . what climate science tells 
us， that a stable climate system is an essential piece of ensuring protection of 
liberty? Or not?"286 The flu町 ofactivity across legal jurisdictions， irrespec-
tive of their near-term outcomes suggest that alternative bottom-lines are up 
for serious negotiation. At the very least， this activity militates in favor of 
continued and concerted effort in courts and legislatures and cautious opti-
mism about a tipping point for the transformation of existing legal 
architecture. 
CONCLUSION 
Law is never static， but rather， lives in each new context. In fact， 
one of the most important things to understand about any law is how 
it changes. And it has ωchange in order to be an ~酔ctive part of 
govemance-it has to be appropriate to new contexts and circum-
st，αnces or it simply will not work. It also it has to be 
appropriate ωthe experiences of the people or it 
will have no meaning or legitimacy. 
- Val Napoleon287 
283 See Ely v. Veld巴， 451 F.2d 1130， 1139 (4白 Cir.1971) (“While a growing number of 
commentators argue in support of a constitutiona1 protection for the巴nvironment，白1凶sn巴wl砂y-
advanced c∞onst1山t1旬utio叩na陪叫1do∞c紅肘m即l児巴 has not yet b恥ee阻na，低.c∞or吋ded卯u刈凶dicαla剖1sa叩n民削ct1ωO叩n叫1叫礼山[日.]"
also Lake v. City of Southgate， No. 16-10251，2017 WL 767879， at*4 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 28， 
2017) (finding that U.S. courts have consistently rejected the claim that individua1s have a 
加 ldamentalconstitutional right to a c1ean and healthful environment); ln re Agent Orange 
Prod. Liab. Litig.， 475 F. Supp. 928， 934 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding that白ereis no constitu-
tional right to a healthful environment); Pinkney v. Ohio Envtl. Prot. Agency， 375 F. Supp. 
305，310 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (holding白atthere is no “白ndamenta1right to a healthful environ-
ment implicitly or explicitly in the Constitution"); Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp.， 340 F. Supp. 
532， 537 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (finding that the Constitution does not provide a “lega11y巴nforcea-
ble right to a healthful environm巴nt");Envtl. Def. Fund， Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of U. S. 
Army， 325 F. Supp. 728， 739 (E.D. Arkふsupplemented，325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971) 
(finding that血巴 rightto a c1ean and healthy environment is not protected by出巴 U.S.Constitu-
tion and deferring to出elegislative and ex巴cutivebranches of govemment to make this 
determination). 
284 See Obergefell v. Hodges， 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (recognizing same sex marriage); 
Michael Burger， 4 Things to Listenfor的 Monday'sJuliana Oral Argument， CLIMATE L. BLOG 
(Dec. 8， 2017)， htp://blogs.law.columbia.edulc1imatechange/2017/l2/08/4-白ings-to-listen-for-
in-mondays-juliana-oral-argumentl [https:llperma.cc/CM2Y-GPRU]. 
285 See， e.g.， Juliana v. U.S.， 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016)， motion to certify appeal 
denied， No. 6:15-CV・01517-TC，2017 WL 2483705 (D. Or. June 8， 2017). 
286 Burger， supra note 284. 
287 Napoleon， supra note 227， at4. 
2018] Climate Migration， Regime Shift， a New Theory of Justice 493 
Numerous rights discourses and critica11egal theories have highlighted 
the excesses and inequities that have brought the global community to this 
point. Those discourse and theories have also forwarded elegant， and long-
standing， a1tematives to the status quo. Literatures on traditional knowledge 
and indigenous legal orders， earth jurisprudence， and environmental justice 
embrace and articulate approaches that seek the most just outcomes for the 
worst off， inc1uding the non-human natural wor1d. And， a1though these dis-
courses and foundational principles may appear a radical departure from cur-
rent geosociopoltica1 structures and the legal infrastructure that undergirds 
them， those seeking justice-behind the veil-may imply or mandate those 
principles for our c1imate constrained wor1d. 
U1timately， however， a satisfactory theory of justice wi1 not only need 
to be germane and effectual over a wide range of questions posed in a future 
marked by const佃 tlychanging ecological baselines，288 it wi1 also embed an 
iterative process of reconsideration as conditions require. 
Of course， itis a1most laughable and certainly heartbreaking to ponder 
whether some version of this inquiry can proceed at this moment given the 
current political c1imate-at least in the climate of the United States. As 1 
have conceded in earlier appea1s for c1imate reparations，289 the value of a 
proposal and its viability are often greatly rnisaligned. Here， too， the value of 
a disquisition on veils， original positions， and theories of justice may seem 
lirnited in reality. While perhaps less plausible in practice today， the non-
hypothetical veil is most useful at this stage to shine a bright light on the 
profound failing of our legal regimes vis-a-vis c1imate change and the con-
temporary human condition-uniquely demonstrated by the phenomenon of 
c1imate-induced rnigration. As daunting and implausible as correcting the 
current geopolitical order may seem， the true parade of horribles that wi1 
emerge from an inequitable and poorly managed wor1d由atis 40 Celsius 
warmer-though perhaps unimaginable-may indeed be inevitable. 
The sincere hope is that we wi1 choose the least-worst option. 
288 See RA WLS， 1999巴d.，supra note 213， at xix. 
289 Burk巴t，Climate Reparations， supra note 58. 
